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executive Summary
The BP oil spill in the Gulf  of  Mexico is destined to take its place as one of  the greatest 
environmental disasters in the history of  the United States, or for that matter, of  the entire 
planet.  Like so many other disasters on that list, it was entirely preventable.
BP must shoulder its share of  the blame, of  course.  Similarly, the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS)—since reorganized and rebranded—has come under much deserved 
criticism for its failure to rein in BP’s avaricious approach to drilling even where it was 
unable to respond to a worst-case scenario in a responsible and timely fashion.  But the 
problems run much deeper than a single risk-taking company and a single dysfunctional 
regulatory agency.
This report sketches out widespread regulatory failure, touching several agencies of  the 
federal government and affecting several critical environmental statutes.  Prepared by 
Member Scholars of  the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), it has two goals:  (1) to 
identify how and why the regulatory system failed to protect the public and environment 
and prevent the BP disaster, and (2) to recommend the priority reforms that are essential to 
correct these regulatory deficiencies.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion and well blowout have already been the subject of  
intensive congressional investigation and will continue to be investigated by the National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling and other 
bodies in the months to come.  Witnesses before Congress, 
internal agency investigations, and media reports have also 
brought to light pieces of  the picture of  inadequacies in 
the regulatory system, typically with a focus on a single 
agency or regulatory flaw.  This report builds on, but does 
not duplicate, this work uncovering the factual and technical 
detail surrounding the disaster.
The report connects the dots among the various statutory 
and regulatory regimes that should have prevented this 
disaster and the attendant human, environmental, and 
economic loss.  It lays out a map of  the regulatory failures 
and provides a succinct guide to the key reforms that 
are needed to avoid similar catastrophes in the future.  
Specifically, it finds:
Regulators at the Department of  the Interior’s • 
MMS routinely accepted assurances that a blowout 
was unlikely and adopted safety and environmen-
tal standards developed by industry.  The absence 
of  any technology-forcing mandate in the Outer 
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Continental Shelf  Lands Act (OCSLA) meant that industry lacked any incentive to 
develop new and better safety technology.
The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of  the Interior to cancel oil leases or permits • 
if  they “would probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and 
other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the 
national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or human environment.”  But 
the provision requires an extremely high level of  proof  to trigger protective ac-
tion, proof  that is rarely available, thus making the standard virtually meaningless.  
A companion provision governing exploration plan approval requires even greater 
proof  to trigger protection, directing that an exploration plan shall be approved un-
less it would result in a similar condition.
The OCSLA is silent on how to incorporate consideration of  environmental im-• 
pacts into leasing decisions, even though this stage of  the energy development pro-
cess provides one of  the most critical opportunities for environmental assessments.  
Although the MMS regulations require consideration of  all available environmental 
information in deciding to conduct lease sales and direct the MMS to “evaluate fully 
the potential effect of  leasing on the human, marine and coastal environments” and 
to develop mitigation measures, it is unclear whether any new information is gener-
ated or whether the agency merely assesses the very general information already 
prepared at an earlier stage in the process.  
Compliance with regulatory standards has been far from consistent, and the threat • 
of  enforcement has not been a meaningful deterrent.  The industry has operated in 
a climate in which costs were routinely balanced against safety and environmental 
protection.  To motivate compliance with regulatory standards in such a climate, the 
cost of  a failure to comply must be high.  Beyond profound problems associated 
with the culture and funding of  the MMS, several provisions in the OCSLA ensured 
that the cost of  noncompliance was minimal—most notably the feeble fine struc-
ture for violators.  A maximum of  $35,000 per day in civil penalties and $100,000 
per day for criminal penalties does little to deter risk-taking in a multi-billion dollar 
industry.
Difficult as it is to look beyond the egregious ethical violations and regulatory • 
failures at the MMS, it is nevertheless important to recognize that the agency lacks 
important resources it needs to do the job of  protecting the public and the environ-
ment, particularly in light of  the scientific and engineering complexities inherent in 
deepwater and ultra deepwater drilling.  In addition, resources for enforcement are 
lacking.  According to one Department of  the Interior official, the agency has 60 
inspectors charged with covering almost 4,000 facilities in the Gulf  of  Mexico.  It 
needs more scientists, engineers, and inspectors.
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Over the course of  several administrations, the MMS was “captured” by the oil • 
industry, and came to see industry, rather than public, as its constituency.  That made 
regulators particularly subject to pressure and influences from industry, and led to an 
appalling lack of  energy in its efforts to protect against industry excesses.
In 1986, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) rescinded a • 
1978 regulation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that re-
quired agencies to conduct a “worst-case analysis” in their Environmental Impact 
Statements when important information regarding the potential consequences of  
a proposed action was unknown or missing.  Had that provision still been in place, 
it would have forced more rigorous planning by the MMS, BP, and its industry col-
leagues, which in turn might have prevented the disaster or at least led to a more 
effective response.
Over the years, some agencies have abused language in the CEQ’s NEPA regula-• 
tions allowing them to use “categorical exclusions” to avoid preparing Environ-
mental Impact Statements and Environmental Assessments for whole classes of  
activities.  Such exclusions are sometimes appropriate, but their excessively broad 
application—most specifically in instances in which agency actions pose serious 
environmental risks—has meant that many environmentally hazardous activities are 
approved and implemented without any consideration of  potential adverse conse-
quences.  The MMS was a serial abuser of  the process, and that contributed to the 
failed response to the BP disaster in the Gulf.
The MMS routinely ignored a requirement in the NEPA regulations that it consider • 
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts—catastrophic ones, in particu-
lar—even when they are improbable.  In the BP case, the MMS completely ignored 
the risk of  a serious oil spill, examining in its Environmental Impact Statement 
the prospect of  spills no larger than 4,600 barrels of  oil.  Further, in assessing the 
aggregate risks of  oil and gas drilling in the Gulf  over the 40-year life of  its plan 
for the region, it contemplated only that 11,000 to 31,000 barrels might be spilled.  
In the actual event, the BP spill unleashed an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the 
Gulf.
In enforcing the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Marine Fisheries • 
Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (collectively, “the Services”) generally 
rely on the “action agencies”—in the BP case, the MMS—to provide information to 
complete their assessments of  the dangers of  certain actions to wildlife.  Since the 
MMS routinely underestimated the likelihood and magnitude of  a spill, the Services 
were handicapped in their assessments.  Moreover, the Services tend to discount 
risks, even catastrophic ones, if  they are deemed to be low probability events, in-
stead focusing on more predictable impacts, opening the door to disastrous results.
The Services, in carrying out consultations under the ESA, routinely fail to aggre-• 
gate low probability risks of  multiple federal or federally approved actions, despite 
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regulations requiring consideration of  such aggregate effects during the consultation 
process. 
Despite language in multiple statutes imposing the “Precautionary Principle” on fed-• 
eral decision-making, the MMS proceeded in precisely the manner that the principle 
is designed to protect against—an indication that the principle is largely unobserved. 
That is true not just at the MMS, but at other agencies charged with protecting 
against harm to people and the environment.
Throughout the report, we offer a series of  proposed reforms—some legislative, some 
regulatory—aimed at closing the gaps in the regulatory safety net that allowed the BP 
disaster to occur.  They include:
Congress should amend the OCSLA to overhaul environmental review procedures, • 
require inter-agency consultation, and extend deadlines for review.
Congress should act to increase the OCSLA’s penalty and bonding amounts and to • 
provide for debarment of  serious violators.
Congress should amend the OCSLA to adopt strong mandates for environmental • 
protection and safety, and to create incentives for continual safety innovation.
The President should request, and Congress should provide, adequate fund-• 
ing for the Bureau of  Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE)—the successor agency to the MMS—so that it can perform its regula-
tory functions and hire, train, and retain competent staff.
The Department of  the Interior leadership, including Secretary Ken Salazar, should • 
implement new ethics standards, ending the revolving door, and creating a culture 
that supports the agency’s regulatory mission.
The reorganization that led to the creation of  BOEMRE should be built upon with • 
further organizational reforms, including separating several of  the agency’s existing 
programs into separate shops.
The Administration, with leadership from the Department of  the Interior, should • 
develop a proposed national policy for offshore oil and gas development that should 
be the basis for debate in Congress.
With respect to NEPA, the CEQ should reinstate the regulatory requirement for • 
worst-case analysis planning, specifically, the entire 1978 regulation requiring worst-
case analysis by agencies whenever they undertake an action despite the absence 
of  important or essential information regarding the action’s adverse environmental 
impacts.
The CEQ should strengthen the categorical exclusion process, so that agencies can-• 
not inappropriately exclude entire categories of  activity from NEPA’s requirements.
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BOEMRE, like its predecessor, the MMS, lacks sufficient independent scientific • 
capacity to carry out its regulatory mission.  The U.S. Geological Survey would be a 
natural choice to provide such expertise, but would need authority and funding to 
do so.
With respect to the Endangered Species Act, the Services should revise their regula-• 
tions to ensure better assessment of  low probability risks of  harm to listed spe-
cies.  Similarly, the Services should revise their regulations to ensure that agencies 
consider the aggregate impacts of  low probability risks of  serious harm, rather than 
considering each in isolation.
We also offer several broader recommendations aimed at systemic regulatory or energy-
related issues.  They include:
Across the regulatory system, regulatory agencies, with leadership from the White • 
House Office of  Management and Budget’s Office of  Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, should move to reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle, which embodies 
two concepts: (1) we should act on the basis of  reasonable evidence even before 
we have full scientific proof  that a particular industrial activity causes harm, and (2) 
because some harms are irreversible, cost-benefit analyses are particularly inadequate 
measures for deciding whether action is required. 
Congress should repeal all subsidies for offshore oil drilling, applying to the energy • 
industry the same logic that it applies to other areas of  human activity: The govern-
ment need not subsidize highly profitable risky and dangerous activities.
Because the nation’s thirst for oil from all sources is the driver for the risks we take • 
by drilling for oil in remote locations and at considerable peril, Congress and the 
President should adopt an effective climate change policy that reduces the demand 
for offshore oil.
Congress should ensure that BOEMRE undertakes an ongoing, systematic evalua-• 
tion of  the lessons learned elsewhere in the wake of  serious accidents off  the shores 
of  other nations, and of  alternative regulatory measures and techniques that have 
proven effective in those settings.  
In Table 1 (next page), we summarize the regulatory failures identified in this paper as 
contributing to the BP oil spill, as well as the relevant proposed reforms for addressing these 
regulatory failures, which, if  adopted, will enable us to avoid similar catastrophes in the 
future.
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms
Regulatory Failure Proposed Reform
The OCSLA Inadequate Mandates for 
Safety and Environmental 
Protection
Congress should require BOEMRE to incorporate consideration •	
of the environment and safety alongside energy production, as a 
goal, policy, and mandate
Congress should incorporate a clear technology-forcing standard, •	
such as best available technology, for regulating oil development 
technology
Congress should condition BOEMRE’s authority to approve •	
exploration and development plans on the submission by industry 
of adequate data and analysis to demonstrate the safety of the 
proposed activity and the adequacy of the spill response plan
Congress should direct BOEMRE to set federal spill response •	
performance standards
Congress should direct BOEMRE to study accident investigation, •	
information collection, and dissemination procedures employed 
in other high risk industries that involve complex systems, 
such as airlines and nuclear energy, and to develop a program 
that maximizes the opportunity for continuous learning and 
improvement
Inadequate Environmental 
Review Processes
Congress should establish procedures for environmental review at •	
each step of the OCSLA’s four-stage decision-making process
Congress should establish an interagency consultation •	
requirement for each step of the OCSLA’s four-stage decision-
making process
Congress should remove time limits for the Department of the •	
Interior to rule on exploration plans or, at the very least, should 
extend those time limits considerably
Congress should clarify that compensation is not required when •	
the agency denies permits or plans for failure to comply with 
statutory or regulatory requirements, including standards for 
safety or environmental protection
Inadequate Penalties and 
Assurance Bonds
Congress should increase the maximum penalties exponentially•	
The detailed recommendations of the Outer Continental Shelf •	
Safety Oversight Board regarding inspection and enforcement 
should be implemented, with additional authority and funding 
from Congress as needed
Congress should create strong and clear debarment provisions•	
Congress should require that lessees post an assurance bond that •	
more accurately reflects the risks associated with the exploration 
and development process
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
Regulatory Failure (cont.) Proposed Reform (cont.)
The MMS/
BOEMRE
Inadequate Agency Funding The President and Congress should provide adequate funding to •	
enable BOEMRE to perform necessary regulatory functions and to 
hire, train, and retain competent staff
A Captive Agency BOEMRE should implement new ethical standards•	
Congress should increase BOEMRE’s funding to permit reasonably •	
competitive salaries and adequate training for agency staff
To help to clarify and rebalance the agency’s mission and enhance •	
its authority, Congress should amend the OCSLA to put safety 
and the environment on par with energy development; this will 
strengthen the agency’s culture and make it more resistant to 
external pressures
BOEMRE should be further reorganized so that enforcement and •	
monitoring are conducted independently of planning, leasing, 
and exploration and production plan approval and permitting 
activities
BOEMRE should be further reorganized so that policy •	
development is conducted independently from other agency 
activities; and the President and Congress should provide the 
agency with a coherent offshore energy development policy
NEPA Failure to Plan for the Worst-
Case Scenario
The CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 regulation requiring a •	
worst-case analysis
Taking Shortcuts Through 
Categorical Exclusions and 
Inappropriate Tiering
Agencies should document the application of existing categorical •	
exclusions, including providing supporting analysis for why the 
exclusion is not barred by extraordinary circumstances
Agencies should ensure adequate public involvement before both •	
establishing new and applying existing exclusions
Agencies should periodically review existing exclusions•	
The CEQ should consider developing regulations that would •	
require agencies to seek public input and to solicit the views of 
federal agencies with relevant expertise before proposing to rely 
on a categorical exclusion
The CEQ should consider revising its tiering regulations to clarify •	
the limits of appropriate tiering, so that it is used only to avoid 
inefficient repetition of material already covered
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
Regulatory Failure (cont.) Proposed Reform (cont.)
NEPA  
(cont.)
Bad Science Undermines 
NEPA’s Efficacy
Through •	 additional funding and a clear legislative mandate, 
Congress should establish the U.S. Geological Survey as an 
independent science advisor for BOEMRE on complying with 
environmental laws
For technical information, Congress should create an advisory •	
board—independent of both industry and the agency—to review 
risk assessments as well as agency safety regulations and standards
The ESA Ignoring Low Probability 
Risks of Catastrophic Harm to 
Listed Species
BOEMRE should improve its capacity to generate sound scientific •	
and technical assessments of the risk of drilling
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine •	
Fisheries Services (the Services) should exercise their authority to 
demand that action agencies use all the available information to 
supply an analysis of possible outcomes of the proposed action, 
and should suspend consultations if this information is not 
provided
The Services should amend the regulatory definition of “indirect •	
effects” to include low probability but catastrophic effects
Failure to Aggregate Low 
Probability Risks
The Services should amend  the regulatory definition of •	
“environmental baseline” to ensure that low probability risks of 
harm to listed species are properly aggregated
Regulatory 
Design
Failure to Incorporate the 
Precautionary Principle into 
the Regulatory Process
The Precautionary Principle should be reinvigorated and reinstated •	
into the regulatory process to ensure that environmental, health, 
and safety regulations are designed to account for low probability 
but catastrophic risks
Energy Policy Subsidizing Unreasonably 
Risky Offshore Drilling
Congress should identify and eliminate all the various oil •	
extraction industry tax breaks that have accumulated in the U.S. 
tax code
Congress should repeal the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act•	
Congress should take action to terminate the errant leases issued •	
under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act that allow oil companies 
to continue enjoying royalty reductions even though oil prices are 
high
Congress should repeal the various subsidies provided to the oil •	
extraction industry in the Energy Policy Act of 2005
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Table 1.
Summary of Regulatory Failures and Related Reforms (cont.)
Regulatory Failure (cont.) Proposed Reform (cont.)
Energy Policy 
(cont.)
Ignoring Climate Change 
Linkages
The United States must place a price on carbon, either through •	 a 
carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade regimen, so that all social 
costs are incorporated into the price of energy
To ensure the effectiveness of carbon pricing, the United States •	
should eliminate all remaining subsidies for fossil fuels
The United States should seek to promote innovations •	
in alternative energy and energy efficiency, so that these 
technologies are able to compete on a level playing field with 
fossil fuels in the energy market
Lessons from 
the North Sea
Ignoring Other Countries’ 
Experiences with Offshore 
Drilling Disasters
Congress should require BOEMRE to undertake an ongoing, •	
systematic evaluation of the lessons learned elsewhere in the 
wake of serious offshore oil drilling accidents, and of alternative 
regulatory measures and techniques that have proven effective
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introduction
In the weeks following the explosion of  the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and the blowout 
of  the well that BP was drilling in the Gulf  of  Mexico, the picture that has emerged points 
not just to large-scale environmental and economic damage after the explosion, but to 
massive failures before the accident in the regulatory systems designed to protect public 
health, safety, and the environment.  The facts suggest that the disaster and the attendant 
human, environmental, and economic loss were entirely preventable, had stronger regulation 
and enforcement been in place.
As leaders from across the political spectrum have acknowledged in the wake of  the 
financial crisis and again in the wake of  this oil spill, regulation has an essential role to play in 
protecting core American values:  human life and health; a healthy and robust environment; 
and a thriving economy.  We unfortunately now have vivid proof  that the economic and 
environmental costs of  regulatory failure can be far greater than anyone knew and perhaps 
even greater than anyone had imagined.
The report begins by laying out the shortcomings in the primary statute under which 
deepwater oil drilling is regulated—the Outer Continental Shelf  Lands Act (OCSLA)—and 
outlines key reforms needed to provide the authority necessary to protect the public interest.
It then turns to systemic problems within the agency charged with regulation of  deepwater 
oil drilling under the OCSLA—the Mineral Management Service (MMS), renamed the 
Bureau of  Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the 
wake of  the disaster.  These include problems of  agency capture and inadequate funding.
The third topic addressed in the report is the role of  the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)—how and why this landmark statute was disabled from performing its critical 
role in the case of  the BP well, and what regulatory changes can ensure that it functions 
effectively in the future.
The report next details the problems that surrounded the implementation and enforcement 
of  the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as it applied to oil drilling and recommends several 
key reforms.
The report then discusses a systemic problem that is a theme in each prior section and 
that specific statutory reforms cannot fully remedy:  obstacles to making sound regulatory 
decisions in the face of  uncertain, low probability risks of  potentially catastrophic or 
irreversible harm.  This section highlights a common sense solution:  adoption of  a 
precautionary stance.  A precautionary approach would replace the current widely-adopted 
presumption that regulation must await a high—and often unattainable—degree of  certainty, 
even when the potential costs are irreversible or catastrophic.
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In the last sections of  the report, we step back to look at the regulatory system from a 
broader perspective.  We consider first how the regulatory system and its failures in this case 
were caused in part by the absence of  coherent policies on energy and climate change.  Our 
current policy provides vast incentives for risky oil and gas development like deepwater 
drilling and few for low-carbon alternative energy sources.  In the wake of  yet another 
painful lesson on the cost of  our current incoherent approach, it is time to focus political 
attention on the difficult but necessary task of  debating and adopting a coherent and sound 
energy policy.
In the final section, we step back geographically to suggest why another lesson of  this 
disaster is that the United States should undertake to learn more from the experience 
abroad, offering the example of  the North Sea.  Had we been paying closer attention, the 
investigations and reforms in the wake of  the infamous Piper Alpha spill or the Bravo 
platform blowout might have offered insights to help us avoid this disaster.
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i. The outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(oCSLA)
Legal Context: The Role of the oCSLA in Deepwater offshore Drilling
The Outer Continental Shelf  Lands Act (OCSLA)1 is the principle statute governing the 
development of  oil and gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf  (OCS).  In the statute, 
Congress charged the Department of  the Interior with overseeing the “expeditious and orderly 
development [of  offshore oil resources], subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner 
which is consistent with the maintenance of  competition and other national needs . . . .”2  The 
OCSLA also directed that operations be conducted “in a safe manner by well-trained personnel 
using technology, precautions, and techniques to prevent or minimize the likelihood of  
blowouts . . . or other occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or to property, 
or endanger life or health.”3  At the time of  the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS), a bureau within the Department of  the Interior, had primary 
responsibility for implementing the OCSLA; following the blowout, the Bureau of  Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor agency to the 
MMS, has had implementing authority for the OCSLA.
In offshore oil exploration and drilling, health, safety, and environmental protection are 
inextricably intertwined.  Some regulations, like those requiring blowout preventers, have the 
goal of  protecting the safety of  both workers and the environment, by preventing dangerous 
situations that may cause well blowouts or spills.  Others, such as a requirement that the 
agency consider the impacts of  oil exploration on species that live in the area of  proposed 
drilling, have a goal of  avoiding impacts to the marine or coastal environment and human 
health.  In this report, we consider the adequacy of  both types of  protections.  
Oil and gas development activities managed under the OCSLA occur in four distinct 
stages: (1) development of  a five-year leasing plan;4 (2) issuance of  oil and gas leases (often 
called the lease-sale);5 (3) approval of  a lessee’s exploration plan;6 and (4) approval of  a 
lessee’s development and production plan.7  This four-tiered structure was intended to start 
with broad-based planning and then move “to an increasingly narrower focus as actual 
development grows more imminent.”8  For a variety of  reasons, this statutory framework has 
failed to protect public health, safety, and the environment adequately.  Key shortcomings are 
outlined below, along with recommendations for addressing each.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: inadequate Mandates for Safety and environmental 
Protection 
The OCSLA directs the Department of  Interior to consider “the potential impact of  
oil and gas exploration on other resource values of  the outer Continental Shelf  and the 
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marine, coastal, and human environments,”9 and to balance “between the potential for 
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of  oil and gas, and the potential for 
adverse impact on the coastal zone.”10  The Secretary of  the Interior is charged to develop 
a leasing program that considers environmental values and impacts.  Operations in the OCS 
are also to be conducted to promote safety and to prevent blowouts, loss of  well control, or 
other occurrences “which may cause damage to the environment or property or endanger 
life or health.”11
Despite this general language requiring consideration of  health, safety, and the environment, 
the statute lacks clear enforceable mandates setting forth adequate environmental and 
safety standards with which oil and gas drilling activities must comply.12  Instead, the statute 
focuses heavily on development of  oil and gas resources, providing incidental consideration 
of  environmental impacts in select provisions.  The most specific standards the statute 
incorporates provide that the Secretary may cancel a lease or permit if  it “would probably 
cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, 
to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the national security or defense, or to the 
marine, coastal, or human environment.”13  This provision requires an extremely high level 
of  proof  to trigger protective action, proof  that is rarely available, thus making the standard 
virtually meaningless.  A lease or permit may be cancelled only if  it would probably cause 
serious harm or damage.  A companion provision governing exploration plan approval 
requires even greater proof  to trigger protection, directing that an exploration plan shall be 
approved unless it would result in a similar condition.14 
Unlike the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, the OCSLA also sets no baseline about 
the kinds of  environmental protection and safety technology the agency must require of  
lessees.  Instead, the agency is given broad discretion to balance competing interests in oil 
and gas development, safety, and environmental protection.  In consequence, although the 
MMS did promulgate detailed and extensive regulations about the safety technology to be 
employed, these were based largely on standards recommended and developed by industry.  
As has become clear in the wake of  the Deepwater Horizon explosion and blowout, these 
regulations were far from forcing technological innovation and left the United States and its 
citizens with far less protection than is required by other countries. 
In fact, in 2002, the Coast Guard warned that, unless forced to do so by regulation, oil 
producers would not develop new spill response and prevention technologies to match 
their rapidly expanding extraction capabilities.15  Nevertheless, the MMS routinely accepted 
industry recommendations about the level and kinds of  safety technologies and techniques 
sufficient to protect the environment.  BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill showed how unwise 
this approach has been.  Instead of  requiring that the lessees demonstrate that their safety 
technology performed as well as the best available technology, regulators simply accepted 
assurances that a blowout was unlikely and adopted industry standards.  The absence of  
any technology-forcing mandate in the statute meant that industry lacked any incentive to 
develop new and better safety technology.
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Also lacking under current law is an enforceable standard to ensure that adequate technology 
exists to respond to potential spills.  The Oil Pollution Act requires that the owner or 
operator of  a tank vessel or facility “prepare and submit . . . a plan for responding, to the 
maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge.”16  But, by regulation, the MMS 
tethered this responsibility to “the limitations of  available technology” and only required 
consideration of  a worst-case discharge that continues for 30 days.17  Thus, not only is there 
no specific performance standard that a lessee must meet, there is also no assessment of  
whether the available technology is adequate to protect the environment.  This is a regulatory 
scheme that encourages stagnation.  In fact, it creates a perverse incentive for industry not 
to develop newer technologies capable of  cleaning up more oil, because doing so increases 
industry’s clean-up obligations.  Moreover, the MMS regulations authorize operations for 
up to two years while a response plan is under agency review, prior to its approval; and, as 
the recent report by the OCS Safety Oversight Board noted, oil spill response plans “are 
designed to deal with surface oil cleanup, not containment and control of  wells at the spill’s 
source.”18  These provisions demonstrate the lax attitude towards the serious risks inherent in 
oil and gas activities and the need for clear direction from Congress to change this approach.
As the experience with the BP oil spill revealed, in practice, development of  oil and gas has 
been allowed to go forward at the expense of  both safety and environmental protection.  
This will remain the status quo so long as there is a lack of  strong enforceable mandates 
for protection of  the environment and safety to govern planning, leasing, exploration, 
production, and spill response actions.
Proposed Reform: Adopt Strong Mandates for environmental Protection and 
Safety and Create incentives for Continual Safety innovation
To protect the public’s interest in safe and environmentally sound oil production, Congress 
should provide BOEMRE with more explicit direction about how to strike the balance 
between oil production, safety, and environmental protection.  Throughout the OCSLA, 
consideration of  the environment and safety should be incorporated alongside energy 
production, as a goal, policy, and mandate.  The statements of  policy in the OCSLA should 
be clarified so that oil exploration and development will be permitted only where it can 
occur without posing a significant risk to public health, safety, and the environment.  The 
goals of  the statute should include managing offshore oil and gas exploration, development, 
and extraction in a fashion that best protects public health, safety, and the marine and coastal 
environments while helping to meet national energy needs.  Exploration, development, and 
production should occur only when these activities can be done in a manner that protects 
life, health, the coastal and marine environment, sea life (including fish, marine mammals, 
coral, and other species), property, and other uses of  the seabed, subsoil, and water.
In addition to strengthening the policy of  the OCSLA, Congress should incorporate clear 
substantive mandates for safety and environmental protection at each of  the OCSLA’s four-
stage development process.  These provisions should implement the policies outlined above, 
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by requiring agency decision-makers to ensure that OCS oil and gas development does not 
pose a risk of  significant harm to safety, health, or the environment, and that it minimizes 
possible impacts on marine and coastal environments before approving plans, leases, or 
other activity.  This would replace current language that merely directs the agency to consider 
such impacts at various points in the statute.
Congress should also amend the OCSLA to incorporate a clear technology-forcing 
standard, such as best available technology, defining clearly as it has in other statutes what 
that standard means.  It is clear that existing regulations have not been adequate to ensure 
safety and environmental protection.  At a minimum, Congress should direct BOEMRE 
to thoroughly review existing safety requirements and adopt new requirements for key 
safety technology, including but not limited to blowout preventers.  Congress may wish 
to specify some of  the contours of  the new safety requirements, based on the extensive 
technical information that has emerged in various congressional hearings on the subject as 
well as the anticipated report of  the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.  However, Congress should also direct BOEMRE to revisit 
existing regulations in light of  these investigations, to adopt new standards that represent 
the best available technology, and to update these standards on a regular basis to ensure 
their adequacy.  Given the overall inadequacy of  the safety and environmental measures 
under current law, it would be a mistake to focus only on addressing the shortcomings that 
contributed directly to the BP blowout.  A comprehensive review is needed to anticipate 
and prevent other types of  foreseeable disasters, and routine ongoing review is essential to 
avoid regulatory stagnation in the future.  A stronger mandate and better funding for agency 
research on safety will be necessary to support such a program.
In addition, Congress should condition the agency’s authority to approve exploration 
and development plans on the submission by industry of  adequate data and analysis to 
demonstrate the safety of  the proposed activity and the adequacy of  the spill response plan.  
Congress should also remove the perverse disincentive for development of  better clean-up 
technologies by directing BOEMRE to set federal spill response performance standards.  
In doing so, Congress should require that the agency specify two distinct aspects of  
the required spill response capacity: 1) the level of  spill response capacity that must be 
demonstrated, and 2) the level of  certainty that the identified technologies can actually 
achieve that result.
With regard to the level of  spill response capacity, Congress should direct the agency to set 
spill response standards that are based on expert assessments of  the level of  spill mitigation 
necessary to avert negative environmental impacts should a worst-case spill occur.  Lessees 
should be required to demonstrate that their equipment and procedures are capable of  
meeting these standards, and that the necessary equipment and personnel are available to 
respond to an occurrence.  Those bidding on leases should be required to demonstrate that 
they meet these standards as a pre-requisite for eligibility.  This obligation should include 
the requirement that response technologies and practices be proven effective under site-
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specific conditions, and should include same-season relief  well capabilities (an issue of  
particular concern in the Arctic.).  Where no technologies or operation techniques exist 
to protect against a known, significant risk, approval to proceed should be withheld until 
such technologies or techniques are developed.  Such an approach builds into the statute 
an incentive for continual innovation in developing and improving new spill response 
technologies. 
Finally, Congress should direct BOEMRE to study accident investigation, information 
collection, and dissemination procedures employed in other high risk industries that involve 
complex systems, such as airlines and nuclear energy, and to develop a program that 
maximizes the opportunity for continuous learning and improvement.  The recent report 
by the OCS Safety Oversight Board began this task by comparing BOEMRE post-accident 
investigation protocol with several relevant agencies, a foundation on which the agency 
should continue to build.19  Effective analysis and dissemination of  accident or incident 
information can provide both industry and regulators with the opportunity to observe 
patterns and to develop effective responses.  This can help to avert further accidents by 
warning of  equipment or human error risks and could provide regulators information on 
patterns involving repeat players that warrant stepped up monitoring or enforcement.
Regulatory Failure: inadequate environmental Review Processes
In addition to the lack of  a clear and enforceable mandate for protection of  the 
environment, the four-stage planning-leasing-exploration-development process poses 
inherent challenges for incorporating meaningful environmental review.  At present, the 
statute does not clearly require environmental consideration at every stage.  The statute 
contemplates environmental review in preparation of  the five-year plan, and historically this 
has been the stage that has received the greatest attention.20  To be sure, critical decisions 
with important environmental consequences are made at this stage, such as what areas will 
be open to leasing and on what schedule.  However, planning may cover a vast area—tens of  
millions of  acres.  Therefore, the environmental data and assessment that can be done at that 
stage is necessarily somewhat general.
Currently, the OCSLA is silent on consideration of  environmental impacts at the second 
stage of  the process—namely, leasing—even though this stage provides one of  the most 
critical opportunities for environmental assessments.  Although the MMS regulations 
require consideration of  all available environmental information in deciding to conduct lease 
sales and direct the MMS to “evaluate fully the potential effect of  leasing on the human, 
marine and coastal environments” and to develop mitigation measures,21 and although an 
environmental review is performed at this stage under NEPA, it is unclear whether any new 
information is generated or whether the agency merely assesses the very general information 
already prepared as part of  the planning process.  The environmental assessment for the 
lease area that included the BP well contains very little by way of  new information.  Instead, 
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it repeatedly refers back to the analysis of  environmental impacts found in a multi-sale 
environmental impact statement and then offers a summary of  it.22
Moreover, at the lease-sale stage, the MMS routinely designated lease-sale areas without 
seeking input from agencies with specialized expertise in managing marine resources 
and marine safety, like the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Coast Guard.  Nor is the agency required to 
amend a proposed lease sale in light of  interagency objections.  The result is that decisions 
are made without adequate consideration of  their impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems. 
Assessment at this stage is extremely important.  It is at this stage that the agency can 
perhaps best identify critical areas and resources that should be excluded from leasing because 
of  their environmental or economic values.  It is important that the agency be required 
to consult with other relevant agencies at this stage and respond to their objections, and 
that it be provided the authority to exclude important ecological areas from oil and gas 
development activity and to require measures to preserve their integrity.
There are financial reasons why consideration of  environmental values at the leasing 
stage is important under current law, and why subsequent decisions on exploration and 
development plans do not offer an appropriate opportunity to assess whether the area of  
proposed activity has environmental or economic attributes that are too valuable to expose 
to the inherently risky operations associated with oil development.  Specifically, by the time 
it develops exploration or development plans, the lessee may be entitled to compensation 
if  the Secretary cancels a lease or permit for site-specific environmental reasons.23  This has 
provided the MMS with a strong incentive to ignore or downplay significant environmental 
concerns that emerge at the exploration or development stages of  the OCSLA’s development 
process.
The MMS regulations developed pursuant to the OCSLA currently require submission of  
some environmental data and analysis at the exploration and development and production 
stages, but the requirements lack specificity.24  Environmental assessment at the exploration 
and development stages is the best opportunity to focus on specific impacts of  the precise 
plan of  exploration or development proposed.  Yet, the environmental data and analysis 
that MMS has accepted at even this stage has been exceedingly general and in some cases 
generic.25
Moreover, even if  adequate environmental information and analysis accompanied the 
exploration plan, under the OCSLA, the agency has only 30 days in which to approve or 
disapprove an exploration plan and accompanying documents such as the spill response 
plan.26  Thirty days is not enough time to adequately assess the environmental impacts of  
an exploration plan.  The agency is forced by this artificially short deadline to make critical 
decisions without due consideration.  The short time line, coupled with the statutory 
compensation requirement, mean that in the end there is rarely any serious consideration of  
site-specific environmental concerns, or of  cumulative effects of  multiple leases.
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Indeed, after BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, it became clear that BP’s Regional Oil Spill 
Response Plan for the Gulf,27 and its site-specific plan for the Deepwater Horizon rig 
were riddled with omissions and glaring errors.  For example, the plan identified sea lions, 
sea otters, and Pacific Walrus as sensitive biological resources despite the fact that these 
animals are not found in the Gulf  of  Mexico.  (Obviously, significant portions of  the Gulf  
response plan had been cut-and-pasted from a response plan for development activities 
in Alaskan waters.)  The documents also included phone numbers for long-dead experts, 
and incorrect Internet addresses.  Plans submitted by other Gulf  drillers, all of  which 
had been prepared by the same consultant, contained identical errors.  It is clear that oil 
companies had simply been going through the motions of  environmental planning, creating 
meaningless documents crammed with recycled and inaccurate information rather than 
considered response plans tailored to the Gulf.  Given the short deadline imposed on 
agency environmental review by the OCSLA, industry no doubt knew it would be virtually 
impossible for the MMS to give these plans any careful scrutiny.
Proposed Reform: overhaul environmental Review Procedures, Require 
Agency Consultation, and extend Deadlines
Establishing procedures for environmental review at each step of  the OCSLA’s four-stage 
decision-making process is a substantial undertaking.  Determining the type of  review 
appropriate to each stage of  the oil and gas development process involves many technical 
questions about scale, data availability, and appropriate analytic methods, among other issues. 
To assist BOEMRE in addressing these questions, Congress should consider convening a 
panel of  independent experts, following the model of  the highly successful Committee of  
Experts convened pursuant to the National Forest Management Act.28  The Committee 
would be charged to assist BOEMRE in the development of  detailed regulations outlining 
the environmental data to be submitted at each stage and the appropriate environmental 
review to be undertaken by the agency at each stage, to ensure compliance with the new 
environmental mandates.
Congress should also amend the OCSLA to establish a consultation requirement, thereby 
ensuring that BOEMRE draws on the relevant expertise of  other federal agencies.  In this 
way, interagency consultation would become a critical part of  the planning and approval 
processes.  Congress should designate other agencies with relevant expertise, including 
the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the FWS, and NOAA, as 
cooperating agencies29 for the purposes of  all environmental analyses associated with the 
planning and leasing process.  In addition, Congress should amend the statute to require a 
public comment period before any exploration plan is approved.  These changes will ensure 
that a variety of  views are considered during the planning and approval processes, and will 
increase the transparency and accountability of  this process.
Congress should remove time limits for the Department of  the Interior to rule on 
exploration plans or, at the very least, should extend those time limits considerably.  This 
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is essential to allow BOEMRE to conduct thorough analyses of  potential environmental 
impacts of  proposed oil and gas development activities.  They will also provide BOEMRE 
with adequate time to assess an oil company’s proposed response plan to ensure that it 
is sufficient for minimizing environmental harms in the event that a blowout or other 
technological catastrophe occurs.
Finally, the burden of  environmentally sound planning must rest squarely on the lessee.  
Along with the new environmental and safety standards, the statute should be clarified 
to ensure that compensation is not required when the agency denies permits or plans for 
failure to comply with statutory or regulatory requirements, including standards for safety or 
environmental protection.
Regulatory Failure: inadequate Penalties and Assurance Bonds
The information that has emerged in the months since the blowout has made clear that 
industry has operated in a climate in which costs were routinely balanced against safety and 
environmental protection.  Compliance with regulatory standards was far from consistent, 
and the threat of  enforcement was not a meaningful deterrent.  Beyond the problems 
associated with the culture and funding of  the MMS, discussed below, several provisions in 
the statute helped to allow this climate to develop.
The OCSLA contains clear enforcement authority for the agency to seek civil and criminal 
penalties as well as injunctive relief, and it also authorizes enforcement through citizen suits.  
Furthermore, the OCSLA provides for specific liability for corporate officers and agents.  
All of  these are important tools.  However, the fines authorized by the statute are grossly 
inadequate and undermine any deterrent effect of  the enforcement provisions.  In light 
of  the vast profits associated with oil and gas development, the maximum civil penalty of  
$35,000 a day, and even the criminal penalty of  $100,000 per day are trivial sums.  Indeed, 
industry has treated these civil penalties, on the odd occasion when they were imposed, 
as merely a cost of  doing business. The recent report by the OCS Safety Oversight Board 
reveals other constraints that impede the efficacy of  inspection and enforcement that 
warrant follow-up as well.30
Assurance bonding requirements under the OCSLA are intended to assure that businesses 
undertaking oil and gas development activities can cover the costs associated with their 
activities.  The scale of  the damage caused by the BP oil spill demonstrates how vast these 
damages can be.  It is unlikely that even BP’s post-hoc commitment of  $20 billion to cover 
claims will be adequate to cover the losses.  At present, assurance bonding requirements are 
far from assuring anything—current regulations require a bond of  only $200,000 at the time 
of  submitting an exploration plan.31
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Proposed Reform: increase Penalty and Bonding Amounts and Provide for 
Debarment of Serious Violators
To deter lax compliance with health, safety, and environmental regulations, Congress should 
increase the maximum penalties exponentially.  The detailed recommendations of  the OCS 
Safety Oversight Board regarding inspection and enforcement should be implemented, with 
additional authority and funding from Congress as needed.32  In addition, Congress should 
create strong and clear debarment provisions.  Such measures should preclude entities 
with serious outstanding safety or environmental violations from bidding on new leases or 
obtaining further permits for new exploration or development activities.  Congress should 
also include a more severe bar that would exclude companies from participating in oil and 
gas activities on the OCS for a period of  years based upon a finding of  a pattern of  serious 
violations of  safety or environmental standards.
Congress should also require that lessees post an assurance bond that more accurately 
reflects the risks associated with the exploration and development process.  By requiring 
lessees to post meaningful bonds before any drilling commences, Congress would ensure 
lessees thoroughly assess the risks associated with their proposed activities, including any 
worst-case scenarios, before any drilling occurs.  Such a requirement would create an upfront 
price tag associated with riskier drilling plans.  This, in turn, would create a further incentive 
for companies to reduce their risk (and thereby their assurance bond costs) by following the 
safest plan and by developing new safety technologies and spill response capabilities.
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ii. The Minerals Management Service (MMS)
Legal Context: The Role of the MMS and the new Bureau of ocean 
energy Management, Regulation and enforcement (BoeMRe)
The prior section focuses on limitations of  the Outer Continental Shelf  Lands Act 
(OCSLA), the statute that should have prevented the well blowout and explosion of  
the Deepwater Horizon.  But, in addition to shortcomings with the statute itself, severe 
problems within the agency charged with implementing the OCSLA contributed to the 
disaster.  The shortcomings of  the Minerals Management Service (MMS) are vast and deep 
and it is abundantly clear that reforms are needed to address the problems that plagued the 
agency.  They have been the subject of  extensive investigation by Congress, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of  the Interior Inspector General’s Office, 
and most recently, the Outer Continental Shelf  (OCS) Safety Oversight Board.
The Department of  the Interior has already taken a number of  steps to try to address the 
problems, including replacing the MMS’s Director and restructuring the agency to create 
separate programs that divide the leasing, safety, and enforcement functions from the 
revenue collection functions.  In the process, the agency has been renamed the Bureau of  
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), to emphasize a new 
focus on alternative ocean-based energy technologies, such as wind.33  Moreover, internal 
reforms to eliminate the royalty-in-kind program and remedy failures in collection of  
royalties had already begun before the Deepwater Horizon explosion.  This report highlights 
areas of  particular concern that persist notwithstanding these steps and recommends priority 
reforms to address these.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: inadequate Agency Funding
There is little argument that both regulatory and response agencies involved in the BP 
disaster lacked adequate resources to perform effectively.  At the time of  the BP explosion 
and well blowout, the MMS regulated about 3,795 offshore production platforms and 
managed about 8,124 active oil and gas leases on approximately 43 million acres of  the 
Outer Continental Shelf  (OCS).34  In the last 10 years, the operations the MMS regulated 
have undergone rapid technological change and have increasingly shifted to deepwater and 
ultra deepwater environments,35 a change that has increased the level and complexity of  
monitoring and the time needed for permit and plan reviews and inspections of  operations.36
In its 2006 budget request justification, the MMS noted:
New technologies involved in the projects will continually challenge MMS.  
For example, industry has developed and installed several new types of  spar 
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production facilities, each requiring a structural soundness review by MMS.  
It is likely that additional new types of  approaches will be developed and 
need review.37
Yet, during this period, the MMS’s budget has remained relatively flat.38  Staffing of  the MMS 
has similarly remained stable at best, with some reductions.39  As Representative Bart Stupak 
noted in a recent statement:
The number of  producing deepwater wells increased from 65 in the [sic] 1985 
to more than 600 in 2009.  But the number of  federal inspectors working for 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) has not kept pace with the number 
and complexity of  wells and the distance inspectors must travel.  MMS had 
55 inspectors in 1985 and just 58 some 20 years later.  Currently, MMS has 
approximately 60 inspectors in the Gulf  of  Mexico region to inspect almost 
4,000 facilities.  Inspection has not been a priority.40
Acting Department of  the Interior Inspector General Mary Kendall, while testifying before 
the House Committee on Natural Resources, compared the 60 inspectors for the almost 
4,000 facilities in the Gulf  of  Mexico region with the Pacific Coast, which has 10 inspectors 
for only 23 facilities.41  In its 2011 budget request, the MMS finally requested six additional 
inspectors for the Gulf  of  Mexico region,42 and, in the wake of  the spill, the Department of  
the Interior hired twice that many new inspectors, implicitly acknowledging the inadequacy 
of  even the originally proposed increases.
Acting Inspector General Kendall also noted the difficulty the MMS faces in recruiting 
inspectors because of  the considerably higher wages and bonuses offered by industry.  
Moreover, she noted:
[I]nspectors for MMS receive primarily on-the-job training.  The MMS Off-
shore Inspector Training program guidance and instructions appear to be 
considerably out of  date, developed between 1984 and 1991, and credit in-
dividuals with industry experience.  During our investigative efforts, we have 
found indications that inspector training and training programs have not kept 
pace with the technological advancements occurring within the industry.43   
The GAO has expressed similar concerns regarding the MMS’s ability to recruit and train 
well-qualified staff:
Agencies should have sufficient staff  with the technical expertise to oversee 
the activities under their authority.  Oil and gas production methods on fed-
eral lands and waters have become increasingly sophisticated over the past 
decade.  Additionally, oil and gas companies now rely on information tech-
nology to manage and oversee their operations.  In a March 2010 review, we 
found that Interior had challenges in hiring, training, and retaining staff  in 
critical oil and gas oversight roles, leading to questions about the technical 
capacity of  Interior staff  overseeing oil and gas activities.44
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These and other similar revelations from the recent congressional investigations as well as 
the agency’s own investigations and statements, including the recent OCS Safety Oversight 
Board Report, have made abundantly clear that the MMS lacked the resources and expertise 
it needed to effectively develop, implement, and enforce regulations for the complex, highly 
sophisticated, and rapidly changing technology employed in deepwater and ultra deepwater 
drilling.  Instead, it has relied heavily on industry to self-monitor,45 the disastrous results of  
which are now clear.
Proposed Reform: Provide Adequate Funding to enable BoeMRe to 
Perform necessary Regulatory Functions and to Hire, Train, and  
Retain Competent Staff
Without adequate funding, the agency cannot accomplish the important functions that have 
been assigned to it—to plan for and regulate oil drilling activities on the OCS and to monitor 
and enforce so as to protect public health, safety, and the environment.  The President 
and Congress respectively need to develop a budget for and fund BOEMRE based on its 
mandates and mission, including any responsibilities clarified or created in new legislation.  
A budget approach based on authorizing only incremental increases from the inadequate 
funding levels of  the predecessor agency would doom the new agency to failure.  Substantial 
new funding is needed for research and development, regulatory development, staff  salaries 
and training, and monitoring and enforcement.  These will enable the new agency to stay 
ahead of  new technology; develop safety regulations rather than following industry’s lead; 
hire, train, and retain capable staff; and monitor and enforce effectively.
The Obama Administration has taken small but positive steps to increase funding for 
BOEMRE.  In May of  2010, President Obama secured a supplemental appropriation for 
the MMS of  $29 million to hire additional inspectors, step up enforcement, and thoroughly 
review agency policies in the wake of  the Department of  the Interior’s 30-day report on 
the safety of  the offshore drilling program.46  While the President and Congress responded 
quickly in the glare of  the publicity from the disaster, experience suggests that once media 
attention has turned elsewhere, small government/lower tax ideologues of  the right will 
oppose reasonable and indeed essential increases in the budget of  the MMS’s successor 
agency.  Yet, the recent modest allocations of  additional funding merely represent a small 
down payment on the resources BOEMRE needs if  it is to responsibly monitor and 
enforce health, safety, and environmental standards for the more than 8,000 wells in the 
OCS alone—much less perform additional functions consistent with the vision for the new 
agency, which includes a vastly expanded emphasis on renewable ocean energy resources.47
Regulatory Failure: A Captive Agency
In order to protect and advance the public’s interest, government must be responsive to the 
voters through the democratic process and able to act independently in the public interest.  
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The history of  the MMS reveals the dangers of  a regulatory agency that identifies strongly 
with corporate interests and lacks accountability.  The MMS is a regrettably apt illustration 
of  the captive agency theory of  administrative agencies.48  This theory postulates that federal 
agencies have a tendency to move so far in the direction of  accommodating the interests of  
the entities they are charged with regulating that ultimately those agencies may fairly be seen 
as a “captive” of  the regulated companies.49  Captive agency theory typically views regulators 
as subject to unique pressures and influences that can push their actions and policies in a 
direction favored by regulated firms.  Among other things, the theory posits that captive 
agencies tend to be unduly passive, ponderous, and inefficient, failing to enforce regulatory 
requirements with needed vigor and enthusiasm.  The MMS’s inattentive, if  not disdainful, 
implementation of  safety and environmental requirements, its reliance on industry to 
develop standards, and its lax monitoring and enforcement all bespeak a captive agency.
One needn’t look far to see the influence that industry had acquired.  Indeed, the very culture 
of  the MMS had become corrupted by close connections with industry and identification of  
the agency staff  with the interests of  the industry, as a series of  GAO reports and the recent 
reports by the Department of  the Interior Inspector General and OCS Safety Oversight 
Board have amply documented.50  The MMS had developed so pervasive a culture of  
deference to and identity with corporate interests that agency staff  failed even to recognize 
unethical, inappropriate, and unlawful behavior in many cases.  The culture documented in 
various investigations and reports included inappropriate relationships between staff  and 
members of  the industry, widespread socializing, acceptance of  impermissible or unreported 
gifts from oil and gas companies that the agency was charged with regulating, and a revolving 
door that appeared to impair agency staff ’s objectivity and zeal for enforcement.51
Commenting on the cozy relationship between the agency and industry, an MMS District 
Manager told an investigator with the Department of  the Interior Inspector General’s office:
Obviously, we’re all oil industry….   We’re all from the same part of  the coun-
try.  Almost all of  our inspectors have worked for oil companies out on these 
same platforms.  They grew up in the same towns.  Some of  these people, 
they’ve been friends with all their life.  They’ve been with these people since 
they were kids.  They’ve hunted together.  They fish together.  They skeet 
shoot together . . . .  They do this all the time.52 
Conditions that fostered this unhealthy relationship and allowed it to prosper have roots 
deeper than inadequate ethics training or the failure of  individual personnel to follow rules 
and policies.  Most basically, the MMS’s mandate was skewed to advance development of  
energy resources with insufficient attention to health, safety, and the environment, thereby 
encouraging this identification of  the agency with the industry.  In addition, the agency was 
structured without any measures to ensure that those officials charged with permitting and 
enforcement were completely independent of  those charged with collecting revenue for the 
government from oil and gas operations, thus creating a potential conflict of  interests.53
The MMS is 
a regrettably 
apt illustration 
of the captive 
agency theory 
of administrative 
agencies. 
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Exacerbating this structural flaw, in 1993, the MMS was granted authority to rely on 
offsetting collections from revenues it collected to fund the discretionary portion of  
its budget.  Since 1998, this has become a significant source of  funding for the agency, 
comprising from 40 to 50 percent of  its discretionary budget in most years.  As pressure to 
reduce agency budgets has grown, the MMS has thus become more dependent on drilling 
in order to fulfill its protective functions, a clear conflict.54  At the staff  level, the recent 
OCS Safety Oversight Board Report noted that employee performance plans and monetary 
awards may be tied to meeting deadlines for approving leases or development plans, 
incentives that could create a clear conflict of  interest for staff.55
In addition to these structural and financial incentives, the MMS’s inadequate level of  
funding, as discussed above, made the agency dependent on industry expertise to aid it in 
developing regulatory standards and made industry the primary training ground for agency 
staff.  This, in turn, contributed to the revolving door between the agency and industry.  
Acting Department of  the Interior Inspector General Mary Kendall highlighted this concern 
in submitting her report to Secretary of  the Interior Ken Salazar:  “Of  greatest concern to 
me is the environment in which these inspectors operate—particularly the ease with which 
they move between industry and government.”56  Similarly, a GAO report observed:
[K]ey technical positions responsible for oversight of  oil and gas activities 
have experienced high turnover rates, which, according to Interior officials, 
impede these employees’ capacity to oversee oil and gas activities.  These 
positions included petroleum engineers, who process drilling permits and 
review oil and gas metering systems, and inspection staff—including BLM’s 
petroleum engineer technicians and production accountability technicians 
onshore—who conduct drilling, safety and oil and gas production verifica-
tion inspections.57
Even beyond engineering jobs with industry, many former MMS employees and federal 
legislators have gone on to serve as oil and gas industry lobbyists.58
In the wake of  the BP well blowout, President Obama noted how this corrosive power 
dynamic led to lax regulation and enforcement.  “What’s also been made clear from this 
disaster is that for years the oil and gas industry has leveraged such power that they have 
effectively been allowed to regulate themselves.”59  The anti-regulatory culture is apparent in 
statements from the agency’s own 2006 budget justification:
The OMM [Offshore Minerals Management] regulatory program emphasiz-
es performance results rather than strict conformance to prescriptive regula-
tions.  It clarifies and simplifies government requirements, and promotes a 
greater reliance on industry standards.  The MMS is increasing its focus on 
finding ways to provide strong incentives for good performance while pre-
venting those operators with poor records from participating.60 
Tyler Priest, clinical professor of  business history and director of  global studies at the 
University of  Houston’s C.T. Bauer College of  Business, and a member of  the MMS’s OCS 
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Scientific Advisory Committee describes the dynamic in this way: “MMS workers often rely 
on the offshore industry for the technical knowledge to do their jobs.  In that respect, the 
agency is a sort of  junior partner to the industry and prone to accepting its preference for 
self-regulation.”61  Thus, due to the revolving door problem and cozy industry-regulator 
relationship, even the regulations that are adopted are not uniformly enforced.62
Proposed Reform: implement new ethics Standards, end the Revolving Door, 
and Create a Culture that Supports the Agency’s Regulatory Mission
Secretary Salazar and Director Michael Bromwich, the head of  BOEMRE, have repeatedly 
emphasized their commitment to clarifying and enforcing ethical standards for BOEMRE 
staff, to ensure that the egregious pattern of  violations does not continue.  This is an 
important commitment that should help to change the culture within the new agency and 
may require regulatory or legislative measures to ensure its permanence.  But, stronger 
steps are needed to end the revolving door and ensure that employment at BOEMRE is a 
dignified and realistic alternative to private sector employment, and not merely a stepping 
stone to a lucrative career “in industry.”  Increased funding to permit reasonably competitive 
salaries and adequate training for agency staff  is a necessary component.  While movement 
between industry and the agency should not be prohibited, strong legislative provisions to 
ensure the independence and absence of  conflicts of  interest of  BOEMRE staff  during 
their entire tenure at the agency are important.
The reforms to the OCSLA outlined above—placing safety and environmental protection on 
a par with oil and gas development, and strengthening the agency’s enforcement powers—
would represent another strong step, since they would help to clarify and rebalance the 
agency’s mission and enhance its authority.  This in turn would create a better foundation 
for building an agency culture that respects the role of  regulation.  Building such a culture 
is essential but is not something that can be accomplished solely through legislation or 
regulation.  It will also require skillful managerial steps by Director Bromwich.  The report 
by the OCS Safety Oversight Board is a promising sign.  This report, based on extensive 
surveys of  BOEMRE personnel and other research, confirms the existence of  the serious 
problems outlined above and provides detailed recommendations that merit serious 
attention.63
Proposed Reform: Reorganize the Agency and Separate its Key Functions
The reorganization of  the new agency that is being implemented—separating royalty 
collection and resource leasing functions into two separate programs—is another positive 
step.  However, the ongoing reorganization fails to address several fundamental conflicts that 
remain and may undermine the effort to establish a culture that values the role of  regulation. 
There are at least six distinct functions that BOEMRE performs, some of  which should 
not be undertaken by a single entity.  These functions are policy development; planning 
and leasing; research; plan approval and permitting; royalty collection and management; 
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and enforcement.  Royalty collection and management must be separated from the other 
functions, and the current reorganization properly assigns these to a separate program within 
the agency.  Furthermore, in light of  the culture of  the agency and industry, enforcement 
and monitoring should be conducted independently of  planning, leasing, and exploration 
and production plan approval and permitting activities. 
Another key function that is often overlooked is policy development, a function that is 
currently performed to some extent under the rubric of  planning and leasing.  Under 
current law, BOEMRE is charged with developing a five-year offshore leasing plan and then 
with proposing specific lease sales consistent with the five-year plan.  These actions form 
an important part of  our national policy on offshore oil and gas development, identifying 
what areas to open for drilling and at what pace.  The President and Congress can and do 
step in to remove or open certain areas or to specify other goals, but neither the President 
nor Congress has established a clear national policy for offshore oil and gas development.  
Therefore, the agency, by default, is charged with developing an important component of  
our national energy policy with little guidance or oversight.
While BOEMRE’s broad discretion leaves it free to pursue any of  a wide range of  policies 
on development, it currently faces strong incentives to pursue a policy that heavily promotes 
offshore oil and gas development.  Particularly in the absence of  clear policy guidance, 
the agency is likely to and has in fact become strongly identified with the industry, thus 
becoming a promoter of  development.  Such a role is clearly inconsistent with other 
responsibilities, such as permitting and exploration and production plan approval.  The 
President and Congress should recognize the overriding importance of  policy development 
in this area and ensure that BOEMRE is not allowed to develop policy in the course of  its 
plan development.
Indeed, unless BOEMRE is provided with a clear policy to guide its development of  oil 
and gas leasing plans, the agency may be destined to experience the conflicts that bedeviled 
the MMS.  Without that check, it seems inevitable that the agency will assume the role of  
“promoter” of  oil and gas development, to some extent, as well as regulator of  OCS oil and 
gas development activities.  A similar conflict within the Atomic Energy Commission led to 
the creation of  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to serve as a separate permitting and 
regulatory agency for nuclear power, while the role of  policy development was assigned to 
the Department of  Energy.  Such a split may be similarly necessary here.
The President and Congress must also work together to develop a coherent offshore energy 
development policy.  Absent such a policy, BOEMRE will likely develop some of  the same 
captive agency characteristics that the MMS displayed.  Moreover, a meaningful and sound 
policy on offshore oil and gas development can only be developed in the context of  a 
broader national energy policy.  Section VI below describes in greater detail the importance 
of  developing a coherent energy policy and how the lack of  such a policy contributed to this 
disaster in other ways.
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iii. The national environmental Policy Act 
(nePA)
Legal Context: The Role of nePA in Deepwater offshore Drilling
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was the first environmental statute of  the 
modern era.  The goal of  NEPA is to require federal agencies to engage in a detailed and 
careful review of  major actions that they propose—from the building of  dams and highways 
to the issuance of  permits and leases—before those proposed actions take place.
NEPA’s key action-forcing provision is subsection 102(2)(C), the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) requirement.  This subsection mandates that for every “major federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of  the human environment” the federal agency involved 
must prepare a detailed public statement, commonly known as an EIS.  This statement must 
include:
Information on the impact of  the proposed action, alternatives to it, and any ad-• 
verse effects which cannot be avoided if  the action is implemented;
The relation between short-term environmental uses and long-term productivity; • 
and
Any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of  resources that would be involved • 
in the proposed action should it be implemented.64
NEPA also established a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Branch, 
and authorized the CEQ to develop regulations for implementing NEPA’s requirements.65  
In 1978, the CEQ finalized a set of  binding NEPA regulations.  These regulations require 
each federal agency to prepare its own procedures for complying with NEPA consistent 
with that agency’s particular mission.  Federal agencies are required to identify and establish 
criteria for distinguishing three categories of  agency actions: 1) actions that are categorically 
excluded from further NEPA review because they do not individually or cumulatively 
have a significant effect on the environment; 2) actions that require preparation of  an EIS, 
because they will have a significant effect on the environment; and 3) actions that call for 
the preparation of  an Environmental Assessment (EA) to permit the agency to determine 
whether a full EIS must be prepared.  For actions in the third category, the agency must then 
decide whether a full EIS is required or whether the action will have no significant effects, 
in which case a “Finding of  No Significant Impact” must be prepared, explaining why the 
action will not have a significant effect on the environment.66
As described in Section I, deepwater offshore drilling activities, such as those that involved 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, are regulated under the Outer Continental Shelf  Lands 
Act (OCSLA).  Pursuant to the OCSLA, the agency charged with implementing the 
statute undertakes actions that include preparation of  a nationwide five-year oil and gas 
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development plan, specific lease sales, approval of  exploration plans, and approval of  
development and production plans.  Each of  these steps constitutes an agency action subject 
to NEPA review.
At the time that decisions relating to BP’s Macondo well were undergoing review, the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) was the agency charged with implementing the 
OCSLA, and thus with ensuring that the required NEPA reviews were carried out properly 
at each stage.  In April of  2007, the MMS released a “programmatic EIS” that purported 
to analyze the potential region-wide environmental impacts associated with the 2007-
2012 Outer Continental Shelf  Oil and Gas Leasing Program.67  Also in April of  2007, the 
MMS released a final “Multisale EIS” that covered eleven lease sales in the Central and 
Western Planning Areas of  the Gulf  of  Mexico, an area covering 80 million square acres 
that included the site of  BP’s Macondo well.  In October of  2007, the MMS filed an EA 
for Lease Sale 206.  This EA included a Finding of  No Significant Impact.  The EA relied 
almost entirely on the analysis performed in the Multisale EIS.  Because it concluded that no 
new information could be found, the MMS did not perform any new analysis and found no 
need to prepare a Supplemental EIS.  In April of  2009, the MMS approved BP’s exploration 
plan for the Deepwater Horizon project without any environmental review.  In its approval, 
the MMS stated that the drilling operation should be categorically excluded from NEPA 
because the danger of  an oil blowout, and any resulting environmental damage, was minimal 
or non-existent.
We describe three major deficiencies in the implementation of  NEPA below, and how they 
ultimately contributed to the BP oil spill.  We also provide recommendations for reform in 
each of  these areas.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Failure to Plan for the Worst-Case Scenario 
To promote full disclosure by project proponents and meaningful scrutiny by decision-
makers and the public, the 1978 NEPA regulations issued by the CEQ required federal 
agencies to include a worst-case analysis (WCA), along with a discussion of  the probability 
of  its occurrence, in their EISs.68  A WCA was not required for every proposed major federal 
action, but only when important information regarding the potential consequences of  the 
action was unknown or missing.  The regulation was a reasonable and even necessary means 
of  dealing with uncertainty—it forced the federal agency to consider the severity and risk of  
possible catastrophic environmental effects, and to balance the need for the action against 
that risk.  Rather than jumping blindly into the unknown, industries and agencies alike had to 
face the uncertainties related to their proposals, reveal those uncertainties to the public, and 
consider scenarios involving low probability but high impact events that might occur during 
the life of  a project.
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Including a WCA is an effective way to screen a proposed action and fill in uncertainties 
or gaps in existing data to ensure that potential defects, deficiencies, and consequences are 
identified and eliminated prior to implementation.  In business, computing, and engineering, 
a WCA is used to help companies ensure reliable, stable operations throughout the entire life 
cycle of  a product, device, or system under the most unfavorable combination of  anticipated 
conditions.  Similarly, in agency planning, performing a WCA during early design stages 
can dramatically decrease the risk of  economic and environmental disasters, thereby saving 
human lives plus millions of  dollars in environmental damages and lost revenues.
Despite its importance, the CEQ rescinded the WCA requirement in 1986 and replaced it 
with a new, watered-down regulation.  The CEQ defended its change of  heart by arguing 
that the WCA requirement called for mere conjecture, and therefore it was ineffective 
as a decision-making tool.  Moreover, the CEQ posited that including a WCA in NEPA 
analyses was too “sensational” and would mislead the public with “endless hypothesis and 
speculation.”69
Contrary to the CEQ’s proffered rationale for the 1986 regulation, it is the failure to disclose 
and analyze all of  a project’s potential environmental effects—especially in the face of  
uncertainty—that is misleading.  Without the benefit of  a WCA, it is impossible for the 
public and the federal agency to assess the true costs and risks of  a project, and it is equally 
impossible for the agency and the regulated industry to prepare effectively for disaster 
through appropriate emergency response plans and other measures.  Moreover, the inclusion 
of  a WCA in an EIS can benefit the decision-making process in other ways, by highlighting 
opportunities for mitigation and by stimulating ongoing monitoring of  potential trouble 
spots during the life of  the project.
In the case of  the BP Deepwater Horizon rig, the industry and the agency failed to consider 
the “devastating sequence of  equipment failures” that was clearly foreseeable but thought 
to be unlikely.70  BP’s own exploration plan, approved by the MMS in 2009, minimized 
the danger of  a spill:  “[I]t is unlikely that an accidental oil spill release would occur from 
the proposed activities.”  Although BP acknowledged that a spill could impact wetlands 
and beaches, it dismissed the significance by stating that, “due to the distance to shore (48 
miles) and the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse 
impacts are expected.”71  The agency’s assessment of  the likelihood of  a blowout or massive 
spill reflected these same assumptions, repeatedly describing these events as unlikely and 
therefore dismissing them with little or no analysis of  their impacts.  A proper WCA would 
have required BP and the MMS to consider and plan for these exigencies.
Proposed Reform: Reinstate the Regulatory Requirement of a WCA
The CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 regulation requiring a WCA in its entirety.  As 
with the 1978 regulation, the CEQ should require agencies to perform a WCA whenever 
they undertake an action despite lacking important or essential information regarding the 
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action’s adverse environmental impacts.  This analysis should also include an indication of  
the probability or improbability of  the worst-case scenario’s occurrence.
Reinstating the WCA requirement is consistent with section 4331(b)(3) of  NEPA, which 
states that federal agencies have a responsibility to avoid “unintended” environmental 
consequences.  Requiring a WCA would also help fulfill NEPA’s twin objectives of  full 
disclosure and reasoned decision-making.
Considering the worst-case scenario, and airing it to the public, probably would not have 
precluded BP’s oil lease or the development of  the Macondo well.  But including a WCA in 
the analysis for the Macondo well would have alerted the public and focused the responsible 
parties on the possibility of  this kind of  disaster in advance.  Faced with the risk of  an oil 
spill of  this magnitude, it is far more likely that BP and the MMS would have done more to 
ensure that the blowout prevention systems were reliable and that an adequate response and 
containment plan was in place before the catastrophe occurred.  Without any requirement that 
the agency acknowledge or consider this risk, the agency can continue to simply ignore or 
hide similar scenarios from the public as it makes decisions in the future.
The White House recently released a report on the MMS’s compliance with NEPA 
indicating an awareness of  this and other shortcomings with the NEPA process.72  The 
recommendations in the report, which the Bureau of  Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor agency to the MMS, has agreed to 
implement, include:
Ensur[ing] that NEPA documents provide decision-makers with a robust 
analysis of  reasonably foreseeable impacts, including an analysis of  reason-
ably foreseeable impacts associated with low probability catastrophic spills 
for oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf.73  
This is a good start.  However, the flaw revealed in this case infects decisions beyond those 
involving the Outer Continental Shelf.  The CEQ should revise its regulation to require 
agencies to perform a WCA whenever they undertake an action for which important or 
essential information regarding the action’s adverse environmental impacts is lacking.  To be 
effective, this analysis should also include an indication of  the probability or improbability 
of  the worst-case scenario’s occurrence. 
Regulatory Failure: Taking Shortcuts Through Categorical exclusions and 
inappropriate Tiering
As noted above, the CEQ regulations authorize agencies to use “categorical exclusions to 
define categories of  actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant 
effect on the human environment and which are therefore exempt from requirements to 
prepare an environmental impact statement.”74  The exclusion of  appropriate categories 
of  actions from NEPA analysis makes sense.  All agencies engage in minor actions, such 
as routine administrative decisions, that legitimately deserve to be exempt from NEPA.  
Including a worst-
case analysis in 
the NEPA analysis 
for the Macondo 
well would have 
alerted the public 
and focused 
the responsible 
parties on the 
possibility of this 
kind of disaster  
in advance. 
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Preparation of  an EIS or even an EA for such actions would be a pointless exercise, given 
the nonexistent or benign environmental effects they have.
Over the years, however, some agencies have abused categorical exclusions to avoid 
preparing EISs and EAs for proposals that would clearly have, or create a non-trivial risk of, 
significant environmental effects.  Due to excessively broad application of  the categorical 
exclusion process, many agency actions that pose serious environmental risks are approved 
and implemented without any consideration of  their potential adverse consequences.  
Further, the abuse of  the categorical exclusion process allows these actions to proceed 
without public input because agencies sometimes fail to provide public notice before 
granting categorical exclusions.
The BP oil spill illustrates the harmful consequences that can result when agencies abuse 
categorical exclusions.  The MMS approved BP’s exploration plan for the Deepwater 
Horizon project under a categorical exclusion.  As a result, the MMS did not consider the 
potential environmental impacts of  BP’s exploration plan for Deepwater Horizon on the 
immediately surrounding environment (Mississippi Canyon block 252).  Instead, less than 
a month after BP submitted its exploration plan, the MMS approved it in a one-page letter 
dated April 6, 2009.  The letter made no mention of  the environmental risks the plan 
entailed, noting only that BP should “[e]xercise caution while drilling due to indications of  
shallow gas and possible water flow.”
In essence, the MMS justified its categorical exclusion for BP’s exploration plan on the 
basis that a NEPA analysis at that particular stage in the OCSLA development program 
would have been duplicative of  those conducted earlier.  As explained above, the MMS 
had conducted NEPA analyses at previous stages in the development of  BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon project, including a programmatic EIS purporting to analyze the potential region-
wide environmental impacts of  the nationwide five-year oil and gas development plan, 
an EIS covering the Central and Western Planning Areas of  the Gulf  of  Mexico (which 
includes the site of  the Deepwater Horizon project), and an EA for the Central Planning 
Area Lease Sale, of  which the Deepwater Horizon project was a part.  That EA concluded 
that the sale would have no significant environmental impacts.
This incorporation of  earlier environmental analyses in subsequent EISs or EAs is known as 
“tiering.”  The use of  tiering has become a well-accepted practice under NEPA, recognized 
in the CEQ regulations, that is designed to avoid duplicative analysis.75  If  an agency has 
prepared an EIS on a broad program, there may be no need to repeat that analysis when it 
later considers individual projects that are components of  the broader program.  Tiering 
is justified, however, only when all the potential effects of  individual implementing actions 
have been fully considered at the programmatic stage.  Often, it is impossible to engage 
in knowledgeable analysis of  the effects of  individual projects at the programmatic stage 
because the location or circumstances of  implementing projects are not yet known.  In such 
cases, reliance on a programmatic EIS to justify categorical exclusion of  individual projects 
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disguises the agency’s failure ever to consider site-specific, project-level effects, even if  they 
are potentially catastrophic.
The categorical exclusion used to approve BP’s drilling plan appears in a Department of  
the Interior manual governing the application of  NEPA to the MMS.  The manual largely 
endorses the use of  tiering by categorically excluding from NEPA analysis many agency 
actions that occur later in the OCSLA oil development program, including:
Approval of  an offshore lease or unit exploration, development/production 
plan or a Development Operation Coordination Document in the central or 
western Gulf  of  Mexico . . . except those proposing facilities:  (1) In areas of  
high seismic risk or seismicity, relatively untested deep water, or remote areas, 
or (2) within the boundary of  a proposed or established marine sanctuary, 
and/or within or near the boundary of  a proposed or established wildlife ref-
uge or areas of  high biological sensitivity; or (3) in areas of  hazardous natural 
bottom conditions; or (4) utilizing new or unusual technology.76
This categorical exclusion is a slight modification of  an exclusion adopted by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) when it supervised offshore drilling.  The USGS provided no 
explanation of  why these actions should be categorically excluded.77  The range of  actions 
currently excluded by the manual is remarkable, ranging from environmentally innocuous 
actions such as “approval of  Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells” to those with the 
potential to create major environmental disruption, such as approval of  BP’s exploration 
plan for drilling the Macondo well.
Even a cursory look at the MMS’s invocation of  the offshore drilling categorical exclusion 
for the Deepwater Horizon plan shows that a tiering of  NEPA analyses is inappropriate in 
the context of  approving exploration plans.  The MMS used the exclusion to sweep under 
the rug the potential risks of  drilling a deepwater well in that location.  The MMS indicated 
that BP’s exploration plan was categorically excluded because the danger of  an oil blowout, 
and any resulting environmental damage, was minimal or non-existent.  The agency simply 
accepted at face value, without any independent evaluation or verification, BP’s dubious 
assertions that:
“The site specific environmental conditions have been taken into account for the • 
proposed activities and no impacts are expected as a result of  these conditions”;
“Due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities that would be • 
implemented, no significant adverse effects [on wetlands] are expected”;
“In the event of  an unanticipated blowout resulting in an oil spill, it is unlikely to • 
have an impact based on the industry wide standards for using proven equipment 
and technology for such responses. . . .”; and
Only “sub-lethal” effects on fish and marine mammals would occur in the event of  • 
a spill.
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Remarkably, the plan admitted also that “[n]o alternatives to the proposed activities were 
considered to reduce environmental impacts,” and that “[n]o agencies or persons were 
consulted regarding potential impacts associated with the proposed activities.”78
If  ever a project was unsuitable for categorical exclusion, this was it.  The MMS at least 
owed some explanation of  why the manual’s bar on categorical exclusions for offshore oil 
and gas projects in “relatively untested deep water,” “areas of  high biological sensitivity,” or 
“utilizing new or untested technology” did not preclude evisceration of  the NEPA process 
through issuance of  a categorical exclusion for the BP well.  Similarly, the Department of  
the Interior regulations preclude a categorical exclusion if  “extraordinary circumstances” 
exist.  These include actions with significant impacts on public health or safety, significant 
impacts on natural resources such as wetlands and migratory birds, highly uncertain and 
potentially significant environmental effects or unique or unknown environmental risks, a 
direct relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 
environmental effects, or significant impacts on endangered or threatened species.79  A 
drilling project such as BP’s Macondo well would appear to raise serious questions in each of  
those areas.
Proposed Reform: Strengthen the Categorical exclusion Process and Clarify 
the Limits of Tiering
Even before the BP oil spill, the CEQ had begun exploring possible changes in the NEPA 
process, and categorical exclusions in particular.80  It recognized that categorical exclusions 
are no longer the rare exception to the need for NEPA compliance, but “the most frequently 
employed method of  complying with NEPA.”81  According to the CEQ, the expanded use 
of  categorical exclusions “has underscored the need for guidance” about their promulgation 
and use.
The CEQ’s draft guidance includes worthy proposals that would confine categorical 
exclusions to the narrow circumstances for which they were initially envisioned—proposed 
actions that have no prospect of  creating significant environmental effects and for which 
environmental assessment would provide no useful information.  The CEQ has proposed 
that agencies considering a new categorical exclusion gather and evaluate information 
and issue findings to support any conclusion that the excluded activities will not result, 
individually or cumulatively, in significant environmental effects.  Agencies should similarly 
document the application of  existing categorical exclusions, including providing supporting 
analysis for why the exclusion is not barred by extraordinary circumstances.  They should 
ensure adequate public involvement before both establishing new and applying existing 
exclusions.  They should also periodically review existing exclusions to ensure that the 
predictions of  minimal environmental effects on which they were based have turned out 
to be accurate, that circumstances have not changed so as to demand revocation of  or 
limitations on those exclusions, and that unanticipated extraordinary circumstances have 
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not occurred in connection with excluded projects.  All of  these revisions would help avoid 
egregious applications of  categorical exclusions such as the one the MMS approved for BP.
Since the blowout occurred, other reviews of  the MMS’s implementation of  NEPA have 
been undertaken.  The CEQ initiated a separate review of  the MMS’s environmental 
policies, practices, and procedures for applying NEPA to oil and gas leasing, exploration, 
and development.82  In August, the White House released a more comprehensive report 
that includes a recommendation that BOEMRE review the use of  categorical exclusions in 
light of  the complexity and risk associated with deepwater operations, including revisiting 
its interpretation of  what constitute extraordinary circumstances and reassessing the 
adequacy of  its consideration of  cumulative effects.83  The report indicates that it anticipates 
that “for the foreseeable future,” BOEMRE would prepare environmental assessments 
at the exploration plan stage.84  This is a wise short-term recommendation but should not 
substitute for the broader reforms outlined above.
In addition, the CEQ should consider developing regulations that would require agencies to 
seek public input and to solicit the views of  federal agencies with relevant expertise before 
proposing to rely on a categorical exclusion.  For example, such a regulation would require 
BOEMRE, before it uses a categorical exclusion for an offshore drilling activity, to solicit the 
views of  agencies with expertise on the aquatic environment, such as the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
can provide valuable input on whether the proposed categorical exclusion is appropriate.  
Further, the CEQ’s regulations could be written to create a presumption that opposition to 
a categorical exclusion by an expert agency would prohibit its issuance.  The presumption 
would shift the burden to the proposing agency to demonstrate that the project in question 
would not, individually or cumulatively, have significant environmental effects and that no 
extraordinary circumstances exist that make use of  a categorical exclusion inappropriate.
Finally, on the subject of  tiering of  environmental analyses, the BP oil spill illustrated the 
dangers of  casual references to more general NEPA documents, like the five-year leasing 
programmatic EIS, as a substitute for site-specific analysis of  BP’s exploration plan.  In its 
recent report, the White House addresses this problem and recommends that BOEMRE 
review its policies on tiering to ensure that they are clear and are “not being used to limit 
site-specific environmental analysis that may be appropriate in certain circumstances, despite 
the availability of  major, prior environmental reviews and studies.”85  This is an extremely 
important recommendation and may capture a problem found not only at the MMS but 
in other agencies that employ tiering routinely.  The CEQ should consider revising its 
tiering regulations to clarify the limits of  appropriate tiering, so that it is used only to avoid 
inefficient repetition of  material already covered, rather than as an excuse to avoid site-
specific assessment.
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Regulatory Failure: Bad Science Undermines nePA’s efficacy 
Compounding the problems described above, NEPA’s efficacy was undermined by two 
shortcomings in the MMS’s compliance with NEPA.  First, the analyses the MMS prepared 
to comply with NEPA were profoundly flawed, because they relied on unrealistically 
optimistic assumptions about the likelihood of  a catastrophic oil spill and the industry’s 
capability to contain one if  it occurred.  Even under the watered-down CEQ regulation, the 
agency’s assessment of  the risk was woefully inadequate to meet the requirement that the 
agency consider reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts, which the regulations 
define to include:
[I]mpacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if  their probability of  
occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of  the impacts is supported by 
credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the 
rule of  reason.86
Contrary to this requirement, the agency completely ignored the risk of  a serious oil spill.  
The programmatic EIS analyzed the possibility of  only one spill of  about 4,600 barrels 
of  oil and other smaller spills, and the MMS assumed that only 11,000 to 31,000 barrels 
might be spilled into the Gulf  for the entire 40-year duration of  the Gulf  oil and gas 
development program.  Then both the Multisale EIS and the EA for the specific lease sale 
relied on this same grossly inaccurate characterization.  In describing the risks to various 
resources, including sea turtles, fisheries, and marine mammals, the assessment of  the risks 
associated with a blowout relied on generalities—that the nature of  the risk would depend 
on the magnitude and frequency of  the accidents, the ability to respond to accidents, the 
location and date of  accidents, and various meteorological and hydrological factors.  This 
whitewashing of  the prospect of  a significant spill reveals a serious problem in the capacity 
or independence of  the MMS’s scientists who prepared the analysis.
The failure to consider the risk of  a catastrophic spill from BP’s Deepwater Horizon project 
contributed to the second serious shortcoming in the agency’s assessment under NEPA.  
Because the risk of  a large spill was simply excluded from consideration, the agency also 
overlooked the cumulative risk of  a large spill—that is, the impacts on the environment 
from the incremental impact of  the proposed action when added to past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions.  The CEQ regulations require agencies to consider cumulative 
impacts even in deciding the threshold question of  whether the environmental impacts of  
an activity will be significant, and thus require the preparation of  an EIS.87  When, as with 
drilling in the Gulf  of  Mexico, there are thousands of  oil wells and manned drilling rigs, 
the cumulative risks posed by the large number of  activities in the same area will be highly 
significant.88  Although the risk of  a blowout of  any individual well may be very low, when 
the cumulative risk is considered, the picture of  potential impacts changes.  Consideration of  
the cumulative impact may provide agencies and the public crucial information in deciding 
whether the drilling is worth the risk, especially in an area of  such environmental and 
economic importance as the Gulf  of  Mexico.  But, because the agency failed to realistically 
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consider the risks associated with drilling—even setting aside the worst-case scenario—this 
information never received consideration.
Moreover, as is explained below, the MMS’s inadequate science compromised the 
implementation of  the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the statute designed to protect 
endangered and threatened species, such as whales and sea turtles.  The wildlife agencies 
charged with implementation of  the ESA must rely in large part on the expertise of  the 
action agency—in this case the MMS—to describe the activity it proposes to take and the 
potential hazards the action presents.  Indeed, the wildlife agencies cannot be expected 
to have the technical expertise necessary to assess the risk of  an oil well blowout, or to 
determine the size of  the spill that a major drilling accident might entail.  Although, as 
is discussed further in Section IV, the wildlife agencies could and should have demanded 
more information and made better decisions, there is no substitute for sound scientific and 
technical risk assessments produced by the MMS when making decisions regarding oil and 
gas development pursuant to the OCSLA.
Proposed Reform: Provide BoeMRe with Strong and independent Scientific 
Capacity
Section II above describes the institutional problems that have plagued the MMS and the 
challenges that must be overcome to eliminate the worst of  the problems within BOEMRE.  
Given this history, it is critically important that the agency have accurate and independent 
scientific information to ensure that the agency makes sound decisions about safety and 
environmental protection measures.  The reforms already undertaken by the Department of  
the Interior and those recommended for legislative action present an enormous challenge for 
the agency to integrate.  The best option for reforming the BOEMRE’s scientific capacity is 
to draw on and enhance existing capacity outside the agency.  The USGS already possesses 
expertise on biology, geography, geology, geospatial information, and water.  With adequate 
additional funding and a clear legislative mandate, the USGS would be a logical choice 
to support BOEMRE in its compliance with the OCSLA, NEPA, the ESA, the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and other relevant statutes.  For technical information, 
Congress should create an advisory board—independent of  both industry and the agency—
to review risk assessments as well as agency safety regulations and standards.  This structural 
reform of  BOEMRE would improve the agency’s implementation of  the OCSLA as well as 
ensuring better compliance with NEPA.
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iV. The endangered Species Act (eSA)
Legal Context: The Role of the eSA in Deepwater offshore Drilling
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the primary U.S. law for protecting animal and 
plant species that are in danger of  becoming extinct.  Its goal is to protect species listed as 
threatened or endangered—as well as the ecosystems upon which those species depend—
from being harmed by human activities, whether those activities are carried out by the 
federal government or by private individuals.
Section 7 of  the statute governs actions taken by federal agencies, such as the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS).  Specifically, this section requires federal agencies to ensure 
that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of  a listed species 
or destroy or adversely modify a listed species’ designated critical habitat.  To assist 
agencies in complying with these prohibitions, section 7 establishes a consultation process 
requiring federal agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and/
or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), as appropriate, before undertaking a 
proposed action that may affect listed species or critical habitat.  The FWS and/or the 
NMFS (collectively “the Services”) then provide the agency with a “biological opinion” as to 
whether the proposed action is likely to run afoul of  the ban on jeopardy and critical habitat 
destruction.  In the consultation process, the Services consider both “direct effects” and 
“indirect effects.”  Direct effects are those that are directly caused by the proposed agency 
action.  Indirect effects are “caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are 
reasonably certain to occur.”  
The massive scope of  the Deepwater Horizon spill and its severe impacts to listed species 
and their habitat show that the section 7 process is not working to ensure protection of  
imperiled species from deepwater offshore drilling.  Indeed, the Deepwater Horizon spill has 
already had serious or catastrophic adverse impacts on at least 11 species listed as threatened 
or endangered89 under the ESA, and possibly several more.  Yet, the NMFS issued a 
biological opinion concluding that the lease sales and associated oil and gas activities that 
encompassed the Deepwater Horizon project were “not likely to jeopardize” listed species 
or destroy or adversely modify designated critical habitat.90  For its part, the FWS did not 
even perform a detailed analysis—it simply agreed with the MMS’s finding that oil and gas 
activities were “not likely to adversely affect” listed species and their habitat.91  We describe 
two failures of  the section 7 process in addressing the threats of  deepwater offshore drilling, 
and how they contributed to the BP oil spill.  We also provide recommendations for reform 
in both areas.
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Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: ignoring Low Probability Risks of Catastrophic Harm 
to Listed Species
Two separate regulatory inadequacies led the Services to overlook the risk of  harm to listed 
species and their habitat from a well blowout like the one that occurred.  First, the regulatory 
mechanisms for ensuring that the Services have adequate information on which to base their 
biological opinions are lacking.  During section 7 consultations, the Services typically rely 
primarily on action agencies to provide them with information to complete the consultation 
process, including assessments of  risk.  This has been problematic in the context of  
deepwater offshore drilling, since the MMS routinely underestimated the magnitude of  
harm posed by a potential oil spill.  According to the lease sale that included the Deepwater 
Horizon project, the MMS contemplated only the “unlikely” possibility of  a single large 
spill of  up to 630,000 gallons over the 40 years of  oil and gas activities in the lease area.92  
Consequently, the section 7 consultation documents provided to the Services for this lease 
sale also relied on this faulty estimate, which turned out to be a miniscule fraction of  the oil 
actually released during the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
Second, apart from the inadequacies of  the MMS’s assessments of  risk, the Services’ 
tend to discount risks—even potentially catastrophic ones—if  they are deemed to be 
low probability.  In implementing the ESA’s section 7 consultation process, the Services 
generally focus on assessing relatively predictable impacts of  planned agency actions (such 
as impacts to species and their habitats that attend timber sales, dam operations, wetland 
fills, and similar activities), which the Services generally call “direct effects.”  While section 7 
regulations also require consideration of  “indirect effects” of  agency actions, such effects are 
narrowly defined to include only effects caused by the proposed action that are “later in time, 
but still are reasonably certain to occur.”93  So, although there is no question that BP’s exploration 
activities approved by the MMS caused the blowout, the definitions of  both “direct” and 
“indirect” effects seem to permit the Services to ignore effects that are not “reasonably 
certain to occur”—such as the consequences of  a low probability but catastrophic accident 
like what actually took place in the Gulf.  In other words, low probability risks are in essence 
discounted to zero in the Services’ current implementation of  the ESA’s section 7 process.
The Services took this approach to discounting risk when they consulted with the MMS 
for the lease sale that included the Deepwater Horizon project.  For example, the FWS 
found 17 to 27 percent likelihood that an oil spill greater than 1,000 barrels would reach 
designated critical habitat of  piping plovers.  Finding this probability to be “low,” the agency 
thus concurred with the MMS’s determination that the leasing and associated activities were 
“not likely to adversely affect” listed species and critical habitat.94  As such, the biological 
consequences of  a potential oil spill—even a catastrophic one—did not constitute indirect 
effects, since a spill was not “reasonably certain to occur,” and therefore the FWS was able 
to ignore this risk as part of  its consultation.
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Virtually no one would get on an airplane if  it had a one-in-four risk of  crashing.  Similarly, 
discounting risks of  this magnitude to threatened and endangered species and their habitat 
is inconsistent with Congress’ intent that the ESA provide these species a high level of  
protection.  For agency actions that have few direct impacts but pose an indirect, non-
negligible risk of  serious or catastrophic harm due to unanticipated problems arising from 
the proposed action, the section 7 regulations’ “reasonably certain to occur” standard 
enables the Services to simply ignore the risk of  potentially serious harm.
Proposed Reform: ensure Better Assessment of Low Probability Risks of Harm 
to Listed Species
To begin with, it is imperative to ensure that the Services receive more accurate information 
regarding the magnitude of  potential risks associated with proposed federal agency 
actions.  Elsewhere in this paper, we have recommended improving BOEMRE’s capacity 
to generate sound scientific and technical assessments of  the risk of  drilling.  We have also 
recommended the reinstatement of  worst-case analysis under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure accurate assessment of  the possible environmental 
consequences of  oil and gas activities.  Both of  these reforms are also essential to the section 
7 consultation process.  Without an accurate risk assessment, no consultation will accurately 
assess the risks to listed species and their habitats.
However, the Services also have other tools they can employ in cases in which they realize 
that an action agency has provided them with information that fails to adequately consider 
the biological impacts of  low probability events with potentially serious consequences for 
listed species.  Specifically, by relying on the ESA’s mandate that federal agencies act on the 
basis of  the best available scientific information in complying with section 7, the Services 
can demand that the action agency use all the available information to supply an analysis 
of  possible outcomes of  the proposed action—including the biological consequences 
of  outcomes that carry a relatively low risk of  taking place, but would have devastating 
impacts if  they did take place.  Thus, the ESA essentially provides its own regulatory basis 
for requiring a worst-case analysis for actions that generate risk to listed species and their 
habitat.  Moreover, the ESA’s section 7 regulations give the Services authority to suspend 
the consultation process pending receipt of  additional information from an action agency.95  
As such, the Services should begin using this authority aggressively to demand from action 
agencies better estimates of  the magnitude of  potential risk associated with their proposed 
actions.
In addition, the Services should significantly revise the regulations governing the ESA’s 
section 7 consultation process in order to better account for the kind of  low probability 
catastrophic risks that characterize deepwater offshore drilling.  The section 7 process on the 
lease decision that included the Deepwater Horizon project demonstrates the need to revise 
the Services’ definition of  “indirect effects” under the ESA to include low probability but 
catastrophic effects.  An additional sentence (noted here in italics) should be added so that 
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the definition reads as follows:  “Indirect actions are those that are caused by the proposed 
action and are later in time, but still are reasonably certain to occur.  Indirect effects also include 
any non-negligible risk of  serious or catastrophic impacts due to unintentional consequences of  the proposed 
agency action.”
This change will ensure that the Services do not discount risks of  serious harm to listed 
species arising from the unintended consequences of  proposed actions merely because 
such impacts are not “reasonably certain to occur.”  As the Deepwater Horizon spill 
dramatically illustrates, taking steps to reduce the risk of  disasters that affect listed species 
is just as important as reducing direct impacts to these species and their habitat.  This change 
is also consistent with Congress’ intent that the ESA provide listed species a high level 
of  protection.  For agency actions that have few direct impacts but pose an indirect, non-
negligible risk of  serious or catastrophic harm due to unanticipated problems arising from 
the proposed action, this revision to the section 7 regulations’ “reasonably certain to occur” 
standard will ensure that the Services can no longer  simply ignore the risk of  potentially 
serious harm.
Regulatory Failure: Failure to Aggregate Low Probability Risks
Because of  their failure to consider low probability catastrophic risks as “effects,” the 
Services have also failed to consider the aggregate low probability risks of  consecutive federal 
actions.  The ESA’s section 7 regulations require consultations to measure the effects of  a 
proposed federal action against the applicable “environmental baseline”—that is, the state 
of  the potentially affected area in the absence of  the proposed federal action.  The purpose 
of  this requirement is to ensure that the consultation process accounts for past, present, 
and reasonably foreseeable future insults to the environment when evaluating the impact 
that another insult—the proposed federal action—will have on that same environment.  
The section 7 regulations define “environmental baseline” to include “the past and present 
impacts of  all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action 
area, the anticipated impacts of  all Federal projects in the area that have already undergone 
formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact of  State or private actions which are 
contemporaneous with the consultation in progress.”96  
In their consultations on offshore oil and gas activities, however, neither the FWS nor the 
NMFS made any effort to consider the aggregate risk of  oil spills due to the many separate 
MMS oil and gas leasing decisions.  In other words, to the extent the Services considered 
risk at all, they simply characterized the risks posed by the specific lease sale at issue as low 
and thus concluded that the proposed sale was not likely to cause jeopardy or destruction 
of  critical habitat.  However, the combination of  many activities with a low probability of  
serious harm invariably leads over time to an overall likelihood that such harm will occur 
(e.g., an activity that carries a one-in-one hundred chance of  causing a serious accident is 
virtually certain to cause such an accident if  the activity is repeated one hundred times).  
Despite this fact, the Services never attempt to aggregate total risk to listed species stemming 
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from multiple federal decisions.  As a result, the Services end up ignoring ever-increasing 
risks to listed species that a serious or catastrophic event, such as a massive oil spill, will 
occur, thus significantly under-protecting imperiled species.
Proposed Reform: ensure That the Services Consider Aggregate impacts of 
Low Probability Risks of Serious Harm
A modest addition to the section 7 regulations would ensure that the agencies no longer 
fail to add up risks to listed species from separate federal actions that have already been 
approved by the Services after going through the section 7 consultation process.  To ensure 
proper aggregation of  risks to listed species, the regulatory definition of  “environmental 
baseline” should be expanded by adding the following sentence:  “These impacts include any 
non-negligible risks of  serious or catastrophic impacts due to unintentional consequences 
of  relevant Federal, State, or private actions.”  This simple change would make clear that the 
Services should no longer ignore their previous decisions to approve risky activities when 
considering whether to authorize additional risks to affected species and their habitat. 
The long term effects of  the Deepwater Horizon spill could result in the extinction of  one 
or more threatened or endangered species, and will certainly make recovery of  all affected 
species much more difficult.  The ESA reforms outlined above are crucial to guard against 
similar tragic consequences in the future. 
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V. The Precautionary Principle
Legal Context: The Role of the Precautionary Principle in Public Safety 
and environmental Law
The last time images of  oil-soaked birds and tarred beaches from a ruptured offshore oil 
rig flashed across American TV screens, it helped spur a flurry of  bipartisan environmental 
lawmaking.  The Santa Barbara oil spill dumped 80,000 barrels of  crude into the Pacific 
Ocean off  the southern California coast in 1969, and in the next seven years, Congress 
passed a half  dozen of  the major environmental statutes that still protect us today.  Those 
statutes were animated by an attitude of  precaution in the face of  environmental risks.  
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) forced federal agencies to prepare 
Environmental Impact Statements before authorizing risky activities, identifying, among 
other things, the potential “irreversible and irretrievable” effects of  their actions.97  The 
Clean Air Act mandated the adoption of  national air quality standards stringent enough to 
protect the public health with “an adequate margin of  safety.”98  The Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) mandated the protection of  endangered species “whatever the cost.”99
The Precautionary Principle has subsequently become a pillar of  international environmental 
law, forming the basis for a whole host of  international treaties and agreements.  Perhaps the 
most prominent articulation of  the Principle appears in the 1992 Rio Declaration, negotiated 
by the first President Bush:  “Where there are threats of  serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of  full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”  It’s basic common sense.  If  you don’t 
know whether that dark pool ahead of  you is quick sand, and you can walk around it without 
taking on some other life threatening danger, then spend the extra effort to walk around.    
Two important notions animate the Precautionary Principle.  The first is the idea that, in 
order to prevent harm before it happens, we should act on the basis of  reasonable evidence 
even before we have full scientific proof  that a particular industrial activity causes harm.  
The second arises from the insight that not all harms are equal.  When harm is irreversible, 
you can’t just tote it up alongside economic harms as dollars and cents.  You have to take 
extra pains to prevent it from happening in the first place.  Once oil has spread through 
thousands of  square miles of  ocean, suffocating fish and birds, fouling beaches, coating 
wetlands, and poisoning billions of  microorganisms that form the building blocks of  the 
aquatic food chain, you can’t put the genie back in the bottle.  
Although, to a large extent, the Precautionary Principle simply enshrines common sense, 
virtually all of  the incentives that free markets create for corporations push in precisely 
the opposite direction.  Driven by the profit motive, companies face constant pressure to 
save money in the short-term by cutting corners on measures that would reduce long-term 
risks of  harm to the public and the environment.  Their incentive is to downplay risks of  
irreversible harm and to emphasize scientific uncertainties as good reason for delaying 
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short-term expenditures to avert such harms.  Thus, the Precautionary Principle serves as an 
important corrective to the distorted incentives created by free markets.
Given its tendency to push back against corporate incentives, it is perhaps no surprise that 
the Principle came under attack almost as soon as the ink was dry on Congress’s legislative 
initiatives of  the 1970s.  Some critics charged that it was too strong—that it would require 
perfect safety and thus prohibit virtually all economic activity.  This criticism, of  course, 
painted an unduly rigid picture of  the Principle, which, by its own terms, sets a clear 
threshold for action.  The Rio Declaration, for example, requires “threats of  serious or 
irreversible damage” before precaution is triggered.  Other critics argued the opposite—
that the Principle is so vague as to be worthless, or, in a variant of  that charge, that it is 
indeterminate because all potential actions pose risks on all sides.  Favorite and hackneyed 
examples included the banning of  DDT creating a countervailing risk of  increased malaria 
in Africa, or stricter screening of  new medications by the FDA causing countervailing risks 
from the diseases the drugs might have treated.  It is no doubt true that such examples pose 
difficult decisions for which neither the Precautionary Principle nor any other principle 
offers clear guidance.  But not every instance of  environmental risk takes this symmetrical 
form.  If, for example, the alternative to assuming the risks of  blowouts from offshore oil 
drilling is more extensive development of  nuclear power, then certainly, there are risks on 
both sides.  But, if  the alternative to blowout risk is asking oil companies to spend a little 
more money on safety equipment or instituting measures to conserve energy in order to 
extract less oil in the first place, then the choice is not between equivalent risks, but rather 
between serious, catastrophic, and irreversible harm on one side and no appreciable risk on 
the other.  
Despite having been convincingly refuted, these criticisms are continually repeated, and after 
decades of  attack, the Precautionary Principle is looking worse for wear.  It’s been called 
“incoherent,” “paralyzing,”100 and “mythical,”101 and the Wall Street Journal editorial page 
recently pronounced it a “thoroughly discredited theory.”102  In this atmosphere, it is not 
surprising that in the lead up to the Gulf  disaster, BP and the Minerals Management Services 
(MMS) that was supposed to oversee it did precisely the things that the Precautionary 
Principle is designed to protect against.  They downplayed and, in some instances, utterly 
dismissed the risks to environmental and human health posed by offshore drilling, 
demonstrated a complete disregard for the irreversibility of  the harms at issue, and failed to 
analyze worst-case scenarios.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Failure to incorporate the Precautionary Principle 
into the Regulatory Process
If  any economic activity could benefit from the guidance afforded by the Precautionary 
Principle, it is deepwater offshore drilling.  Various sources have determined that such 
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drilling involved a significant risk of  catastrophe—that is, a major spill or blowout, such 
as occurred at BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling project.  The MMS estimated that the 
probability of  a spill over 10,000 barrels occurring in the next 40 years was 99 percent.103  
A confidential study commissioned by Transocean last year found that in practice blowout 
preventers have a failure rate of  45 percent.104
And, as the pictures from the Gulf  make all too clear, the potential damage from a 
catastrophic spill or blowout was “serious” and quite possibly irreversible.  The marine and 
coastal ecosystems affected by the spill are some of  the most productive in the world.  The 
region of  the gulf  in which the spill occurred contains 8,332 species of  plants and animals, 
including a substantial number of  endangered and threatened species.105  And the Louisiana 
shoreline contains 40 percent of  the nation’s wetlands.106  There is no way to know for sure 
what the long-term effects of  a spill of  this magnitude in the Gulf  will be, but research on 
past oil spills shows lingering impacts even from spills that occurred decades ago.  Fiddler 
crabs in a bay on Cape Cod, whose normally deep burrowing behavior plays a crucial role 
in the salt marsh ecosystem, are still prevented from digging more than several inches into 
the soil by a persistent layer of  oil just below the surface, a relic of  a 1969 oil spill.107  Studies 
in Alaska show that sea otters and other species continue to be harmed by exposure to oil 
deposited by the Exxon-Valdez spill over two decades ago.108  And on another spot on Cape 
Cod, wetlands soaked in oil from a 1974 spill eroded away when the grasses died and have 
never recovered.109
Nevertheless, BP and the MMS failed to follow the Precautionary Principle at several crucial 
stages in the lead-up to the massive oil spill.  In its Initial Exploration Plan, BP asserted over 
and over again that an oil spill was “unlikely,” and therefore concluded that, with respect 
to essential fish habitat, marine and pelagic birds, marine mammals, and sea turtles, “no 
adverse impacts  . . . [were] anticipated.”110  The MMS took a similarly nonchalant attitude 
toward the risks.  It labeled any spill over 1,000 barrels a “low-probability event,”111 and 
did not analyze the impacts of  any spill over 4,600 barrels.112  (By the time the BP blowout 
was finally capped in mid-July, it had spilled an estimated 4.9 million barrels into the Gulf.)  
The MMS also specifically considered the possibility of  a blowout, but assumed that most 
blowouts would last half  a day,113 and ultimately concluded that oil spills or blowouts “are 
expected to have temporary localized impacts on water quality,” “are not expected to damage 
significantly any wetlands along the Gulf  Coast,” and “would have a negligible effect on 
[Gulf  of  Mexico] fish resources.”114  
In evaluating the risks to endangered and threatened wildlife, the MMS and the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) concluded that the chances of  the drilling project harming such 
species’ critical habitat was “low” based on the assumption that a spill would dump only 
1,000 to 15,000 barrels of  oil into the Gulf.115  This was despite the Agency’s conclusion that 
even a small spill of  that magnitude would have up to a 27 percent chance of  depositing oil 
in the critical habitat of  some imperiled species.  The New York Times quoted a FWS official 
as saying that as long as the risk of  a catastrophic oil spill from an activity was under 50 
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percent, it did not warrant protections from her office.116  This is a striking interpretation of  
a statute that the Supreme Court described in 1978 as adopting a stance of  “institutionalized 
caution.”117
Finally, when carrying out its drilling activities at the Macondo well, BP repeatedly made 
decisions to cut corners on safety in order to boost profits.  “Time after time, it appears 
that BP made decisions that increased the risk of  a blowout to save the company time or 
expense.”118  BP chose to have (and the MMS chose to require) just one blind shear ram (a 
critical component of  the blowout preventer that failed on the Deepwater Horizon rig), even 
though experts have since 2001 recommended that each rig be outfitted with two.119  It chose 
not to install (and the MMS chose not to require) a remote control trigger on its blowout 
preventer—a safety device that is standard operating procedure in many other countries.120  
It chose to use only a single rather than a double casing on the bottom section of  the well, 
to forego use of  a safety device called a “lockdown sleeve,” and to bypass a recommended 
procedure called a “bottoms up” circulation of  drilling mud that would have detected stray 
gas in the well.121  It chose to use only six “centralizers” on the well casing even though 
an engineer from Halliburton advised BP to use 21 and warned that using only six would 
cause “a SEVERE gas flow problem.”122  It chose to flout the advice of  experts and the 
requirements of  the MMS’s regulations by not performing a “cement bond log,” a critical 
quality check that would have identified channels in the well casing’s cement that could cause 
gas flow problems—a decision that one independent expert called “horribly negligent.”123  
Proposed Reform: Reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle
There are many lessons to be learned from the Deepwater Horizon tragedy.  But one 
important lesson is that we need to reinvigorate the Precautionary Principle and reinstate 
it as a much-needed corrective against precisely the kind of  short-cutting and short-
sightedness that led to the catastrophe in the Gulf.
The choices that BP made (and that the MMS allowed them to make) leading up to the 
catastrophic blowout were not hard cases under the Precautionary Principle—that is, they 
did not  involve choices that present significant risks on both sides.  Rather, each of  these 
choices involved on one side a significant risk of  serious and irreversible harm—a blowout 
causing an unrestrained flow of  oil into the Gulf  of  Mexico—and on the other side, an 
additional expenditure of  time, money, or effort by BP and a consequent decrease in profits.  
Given that these were easy cases, it is likely that the Precautionary Principle would have led 
BP to make different decisions that would have been designed to minimize unnecessary risks 
of  serious public health, safety, or environmental harms.
Quite clearly, the Precautionary Principle was MIA when BP and the MMS repeatedly took 
unnecessary risks related to the Macondo well.  It has been beaten back by years of  attack 
by industry and its political allies.  Even a statute, like the ESA that was clearly intended to 
enshrine a precautionary stance is now interpreted to throw caution to the wind unless the 
chances of  harm rise above 50 percent.  NEPA is no longer interpreted to require analysis 
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of  a worst-case scenario.  In reforms to the OCSLA, Congress should adopt amendments 
that better institutionalize an attitude of  precaution in the face of  serious and irreversible 
harm.  And the agencies interpreting and implementing NEPA and the ESA should revisit 
their interpretations that fail to respect the precautionary mandate that Congress clearly 
embodied in these laws.
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Vi. U.S. energy Policy
Legal Context: The Role of U.S. energy Policy in Deepwater offshore 
Drilling
The United States has never really had a comprehensive energy policy.  As a result, we have 
never had an effective strategy for balancing the competing interests that determine how we 
procure and use energy.  These competing interests include energy security, cheap energy, 
and non-environmentally harmful energy.  Often, the pursuit of  one of  these interests 
comes at the expense of  another.  Thus, trying to increase fossil fuel production in the 
United States may reduce dependency on foreign oil, but it is also likely to have significant 
environmental impacts and raise the price of  fossil fuel.  To make things more complicated, 
the United States has historically followed a natural resources policy of  transferring publicly 
owned resources (such as energy supplies) to the private sector, which in turn has an 
incentive to make a profit from these transfers.124
The balancing of  environmental concerns in energy policy is especially tricky.  The 
extraction and utilization of  the current dominant forms of  energy (i.e., fossil fuels, nuclear, 
and hydropower) can be some of  the most environmentally harmful activities on earth; 
and yet energy supplies are also needed to support our economy and levels of  human 
development.  While we as a country have never fully reconciled these warring interests in 
a comprehensive energy and environmental policy, we have, through our environmental 
laws, expressed the policy that as energy is produced and utilized, it should not cause 
environmental externalities, which can fall on the general citizenry.  These environmental 
laws include the Clean Air Act125, the Clean Water Act126, and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA).127
In addition, resource protection laws, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA)128, the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), wetlands protection in the Clean Water Act, and 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) have impacts on the extraction and use of  
energy in this country.  Because many energy sources are located on federal land or require 
federal approval for extraction or utilization, laws that control the activities of  federal 
agencies (i.e., NEPA, the ESA, and wetlands protection in the Clean Water Act) also have a 
significant effect on energy supplies.  The federal laws that allow the government to lease or 
sell energy resources to the private sector, such as the Outer Continental Shelf  Lands Act 
(OCSLA), also require consideration of  general environmental values.129
Together, these laws advance the goal of  avoiding harm or serious risk of  harm to human 
health or the environment when extracting or using energy.  Put differently, they seek to 
ensure that energy pays its own way from cradle to grave.  U.S. energy policy—primarily 
expressed through congressional legislation and executive orders—often undermines 
the pursuit of  this goal, however.  Several components of  our energy policy allow the 
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energy sector to escape the full costs of  their extraction or utilization activities, leading to 
unnecessary environmental and human harm.
Properly understood, the BP oil spill is a direct result of  a dysfunctional energy policy, driven 
largely by our nation’s addiction to fossil fuels.  What else but an addiction to oil would drive 
the United States to drill over one mile beneath the ocean’s surface in some of  the most 
delicate and important ecosystems in the world?  In 2007, the United States consumed an 
average of  20,680,000 barrels of  oil every day.130  With the world’s oil supplies dwindling 
quickly, the United States has resorted to extracting oil from remoter and more challenging 
sources in order to satisfy its addiction.
Given the technological challenges and substantial risks involved in deepwater offshore 
drilling, the occurrence of  something like the BP oil spill was not a matter of  “if ” but 
“when.”  Without serious reforms to our energy policy, the next BP oil spill will continue to 
loom on the horizon.  Below, we describe some of  the problematic aspects of  our energy 
policy that contributed to the BP oil spill.  We also provide recommendations for reforming 
these aspects of  U.S. energy policy.
Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: Subsidizing Unreasonably Risky offshore Drilling
As a general rule, the U.S. government does not subsidize dangerous or risky activities.  
Rather, it often finds that it is good policy to tax these activities to ensure that those who 
do engage in them bear their full costs.  Thus, the government doesn’t give public money 
to smokers to help them pay for cigarettes; instead, it taxes the sale of  cigarettes and uses 
the proceeds to help offset the costs of  providing healthcare services, which smokers 
presumably use more of, as a result of  their unhealthy activity.
For many decades now, offshore drilling has somehow escaped this sound policy logic.  
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the offshore oil industry has received billions of  
dollars in subsidies, in the form of  earmarks, tax breaks, and royalty payment exemptions.  
These policies have deprived the U.S. Treasury of  billions of  dollars in revenue, while 
encouraging oil companies to engage in unreasonably risky oil extraction activities.
Some of  the tax breaks from which the oil industry benefits have been around for nearly 
a century, dating back to a time when subsidies were arguably necessary to jumpstart the 
fledgling oil extraction industry.  Moreover, Congress has failed to repeal to these tax 
breaks—and continued to add new ones—even as the oil extraction has grown into one 
of  the most profitable industries in the world.  As a result, today oil extraction is one of  
the most heavily subsidized industries in the world.131  According to a 2005 Congressional 
Budget Office study, many capital investments associated with oil extraction, including 
oil field leases and drilling equipment, are taxed at a rate of  only 9 percent—among the 
lowest rate for any industry, and significantly lower than the overall rate of  25 percent for 
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businesses in general.132  Other oil industry tax breaks include deductions for many drilling 
costs and credits for low-volume oil and gas wells.  These tax breaks save the oil extraction 
industry an estimated $4 billion per year.133  BP’s Deepwater Horizon project benefited from 
many of  these tax breaks.  For instance, before the oil spill, BP was deducting $225,000 a day 
by using an oil industry tax break that allowed it to write off  70 percent of  the rent it was 
paying to Transocean for the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.134
The royalty exemptions for oil extraction companies are of  a more recent vintage, having 
been established by Congress in 1995 as part of  the Deep Water Royalty Relief  Act.  The 
Act was intended to encourage deepwater drilling activities at a time when oil prices were so 
low—about $18 a barrel—as to make these activities unprofitable without a subsidy.  Under 
the Act, oil extraction companies were permitted to pay reduced royalties on wells leased 
between 1996 and 2000 that were located 200 meters or more underwater.  The reduction 
rate increased proportional to the depth of  the well.  All reduction rates were only supposed 
to be applicable when oil was selling for less than $34 a barrel.135  However, roughly 1,000 
leases issued in 1998 and 1999 continue to benefit from the reduced royalty rates—even 
though oil now sells for around $70 a barrel—since a clerical error in the leasing contracts 
omitted the $34-per-barrel threshold requirement.  The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) estimates that these royalty exemptions could cost the U.S. Treasury more than $55 
billion in lost revenue over the lifetime of  the leases.136
Even without the royalty reductions permitted by the Deep Water Royalty Relief  Act, oil 
extraction companies operating in the United States enjoy some of  the lowest royalty rates in 
the world.  According to a 2008 GAO report, of  the 104 jurisdictions that received royalties 
from oil revenue, only 11 had lower payment rates than the United States.137
The most recent comprehensive energy legislation—the Energy Policy Act of  
2005—provided billions of  dollars of  additional subsidies to oil extraction companies at a 
time when offshore oil development in the Gulf  of  Mexico was already in full swing and 
oil companies were making record profits.  Based on recommendations from then-Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s energy task force, the Act contains new tax benefits and royalty 
payment exemptions for the oil industry.  Significantly, the royalty exemptions apply to 
certain existing leases in the Western and Central Gulf  of  Mexico for wells located 400 
meters or more under water, as well as new leases issued within five years after the Act went 
into effect.138  The Act also included a $50-million annual earmark to support technical 
research for the industry.139
Proposed Reform: Repeal All Subsidies for offshore Drilling
Congress should take immediate legislative action to eliminate existing subsidies for offshore 
drilling activities, including all tax breaks, royalty exemptions, and earmarks.  These subsidies 
needlessly deprive the U.S. Treasury of  billions of  dollars in revenues at a time when the 
federal government is running up massive deficits.  In addition, by enabling oil extraction 
companies to escape the full burden of  their environmental costs, they encourage them 
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to engage in unreasonably dangerous drilling activities.  The BP oil spill provides a stark 
reminder of  the negative consequences that result when oil extraction companies undertake 
drilling projects in ecologically sensitive areas that push the technological envelope.
In particular, Congress should identify and eliminate all the various oil extraction industry 
tax breaks that have accumulated in the U.S. tax code.  Congress should also repeal the Deep 
Water Royalty Relief  Act.  Likewise, Congress should take action to terminate the errant 
leases issued under the Deep Water Royalty Relief  Act that allow oil companies to continue 
enjoying royalty reductions even though oil prices are high.  For instance, it could adopt 
legislation authorizing the newly created Bureau of  Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) to require these oil companies to renegotiate the errant leases 
to reinstate the $34-per-barrel threshold requirement as a condition of  negotiating future 
offshore drilling leases.  Finally, Congress should repeal the various subsidies provided to the 
oil extraction industry in the Energy Policy Act of  2005.
The common refrain from the oil extraction industry is that the elimination of  these various 
subsidies will decimate the offshore drilling industry in the United States, forcing us to 
import more oil from abroad and reducing our energy security.  This argument doesn’t hold 
up under closer scrutiny, however.  Thanks to high oil prices, the oil extraction industry has 
been turning in record profits for years now, and can easily bear the losses associated with 
the elimination of  these subsidies.  In fact, a study by a Treasury Department economist 
concluded that the elimination of  oil extraction industry subsidies would decrease 
production of  American oil by less than one-half  of  one percent, since prices and industry 
profits were so high.140 Consequently, Congress can eliminate these subsidies knowing that 
this action will help protect people and the environment without significantly affecting 
energy prices or undermining energy security.
Regulatory Failure: ignoring Climate Change Linkages
The BP oil spill follows from an energy policy that is over a century old and continues to 
shape our production, distribution, and consumption of  energy while paying scant attention 
or giving lip service only to the challenges of  climate change.  This traditional energy policy 
encourages an energy infrastructure and regulatory program that is largely built to support 
the production and consumption of  large amounts of  fossil fuels, regardless of  their impact 
on the health and safety of  citizens and workers, or on the environment in which we work 
and live.
With the threat of  climate change looming ever larger, the United States needs to adopt a 
new approach to energy that is based on sound climate change policy.  The failure to reorient 
U.S. energy policy to account for climate change concerns has served as a special kind of  
subsidy to the carbon intensive fossil fuel industries, enabling unreasonably dangerous 
extraction activities, such as the deepwater offshore drilling that led to the BP oil spill.  A 
properly oriented energy policy will level the playing field, allowing new and emerging 
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alternative energy sources to become economically viable, so that the United States is able to 
develop a low carbon energy economy.
A sound climate change policy should seek to accomplish two basic goals.  First, it should 
make sure that carbon intensive energy sources bear the full costs of  their impact on climate 
change.  Climate change already has and will continue to impose greater and greater costs on 
society, such as more frequent and more intense weather storm events, increased instances 
of  disease and heat related deaths, and the extinction of  numerous animal and plant species.  
Every barrel of  oil that is burned to create energy contributes to these costs, but these costs 
are not reflected in the price of  that oil.  As such, that oil is artificially cheap, so producers 
tend to overproduce the oil, and consumers tend to over-consume it.  By ensuring that 
carbon intensive energy sources bear the costs of  climate change, marginal or inherently 
expensive sources of  fossil fuels—including, most oil extracted through deepwater offshore 
drilling—would likely become prohibitively expensive, and would be abandoned immediately.
Second, a sound climate change policy should seek to help industry and academia develop 
and promote innovations in alternative energy sources and in energy efficiency so that low 
carbon energy becomes comparable in cost to fossil fuels.  As noted above, there was a 
time when the United States subsidized the fossil fuel industries to help spur innovations 
in nascent extraction and distribution technologies, so that reliable and low cost energy 
could be made more widely available.  A similar approach should be taken with respect 
to alternative energy sources and energy efficiency innovations.  This will enable the U.S. 
economy to reorganize itself  around low carbon energy sources on its own, since the low 
carbon energy sources will be competing on a more level playing field with traditional fossil 
fuels.  In addition, by making cheap and reliable alternative energy and energy efficiency 
innovations more widely available, this will minimize economic dislocation for the poorest 
members of  U.S. society, while we more toward a more environmentally sustainable future.  
Importantly, the transition to a low carbon energy economy will minimize, or possibly even 
eliminate, our current reliance on deepwater offshore drilling.
Proposed Reform: Adopt an effective Climate Change Policy
The United States should adopt an effective climate change policy as soon as possible.  Such 
a policy will not only help us to avoid the worst consequences of  climate change, but it will 
also help to avoid the future occurrence of  catastrophic oil spills arising from deepwater 
offshore drilling.
Consistent with a sound climate change policy, the United States should take a number 
of  steps to ensure that carbon intensive energy sources bear the full costs of  their impact 
on climate change.  Most importantly, the United States must place a price on carbon, 
either through a carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade regimen, so that all social costs 
are incorporated into the price of  energy.  To ensure the effectiveness of  carbon pricing, 
the United States should also eliminate all remaining subsidies for fossil fuels, as explained 
above.  This should also include the normalization of  tax and accounting rules so that the 
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oil industry is treated like all other businesses.  These steps will ensure that the price of  fossil 
fuels reflects its true social cost, so that it is not overproduced and over-consumed to the 
detriment of  society.
In addition, the United States should seek to promote innovations in alternative energy 
and energy efficiency, so that these technologies are able to compete on a level playing field 
with fossil fuels in the energy market.  Our future energy policy depends upon a significant 
increase in research, development, demonstration, and employment money for a wide 
variety of  innovative energy technologies with the goal of  bringing them to scale.141  Federal 
research and development policy must act in partnership with the private sector, including 
for-profit and nonprofit actors, to fund innovation from basic science to commercial 
marketability.  In addition, the United States should consider employing rate incentives to 
construct a smart grid (i.e., an electricity transmission system that delivers electricity from 
suppliers to consumers using two-way digital technology to control appliances at consumers’ 
homes to save energy, reduce cost, and increase reliability and transparency), expand the use 
of  renewable resources to generate electricity, decentralize production and distribution of  
electricity through distributed generation, and promote energy efficiency measures such as 
net metering and smarter appliances and homes.
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Vii. Lessons from the north Sea
Legal Context: Regulation of offshore Drilling in the United Kingdom 
and norway
The United Kingdom experience
On July 6, 1988, the Occidental Petroleum offshore oil and gas production platform known 
as Piper Alpha exploded and burned into the sea, killing 167 workers (59 people survived).  
Located about 120 miles northeast of  the Scottish city of  Aberdeen, which is the land 
headquarters of  British oil and gas production on the Upper Continental Shelf, the platform 
rested in about 474 feet of  water.  It was enormous, accounting for approximately 10 percent 
of  total North Sea production.  Total insured loss was estimated at about $3.4 billion in 1988 
dollars.  The destruction of  Piper Alpha remains the worst disaster in the history of  offshore 
drilling in terms of  lives lost.
The discovery of  petroleum reserves in the North Sea in the late 1960s was perceived as an 
economic miracle in Britain, staving off  grave financial hardship and allowing the country 
to reclaim its position as an industrial powerhouse within the European community.  Few 
people have ever looked this providential gift horse in the mouth, and the responsibility for 
imposing worker safety regulation on the platforms and rigs that sprouted up across the 
stormy and forbidding North Sea was delegated to the same agency that granted drilling 
licenses and collected royalties for the government.  The Piper Alpha disaster provoked 
a harshly negative public reaction and prompted work stoppages among a usually docile 
workforce.  The government convened a two-year inquiry headed by Lord William Douglas 
Cullen, a senior Scottish judge, which culminated in the Cullen Report, a classic in both 
accident investigation and policy prescription.
Piper Alpha was originally designed to produce oil, but Occidental was in the process of  
converting it to gas production when the explosion occurred.  Mistakes in that process 
undoubtedly contributed to the disaster.  For example, the firewalls separating the control 
room from an area where produced gas was compressed were not built to withstand 
explosions.  The control room was abandoned early in the crisis, destroying any hope of  
maintaining a semblance of  command on the platform.
The proximate cause of  the initial explosion was human error involving a lack of  
communication between two shifts of  workers.  During the course of  routine maintenance, 
a crew had removed a pressure safety valve from the relief  line of  one of  two condensate 
injection pumps (used to relieve the pressure of  gas as it was pumped from the deep 
well) and replaced it with a blank flange assembly (akin to a flat metal disk).  At the time, 
that pump was not operational.  When the handover to the night shift occurred, no one 
mentioned this piece of  routine maintenance verbally, although witnesses later testified that a 
sheet of  paper, known as a “permit to work” had been completed instructing the night shift 
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not to turn on the second pump.  This document was never found.  The night shift tried to 
start the pump up, the blank flange assembly leaked, and a large amount of  gas built up quite 
quickly.
Explosion of  this gas led to a large crude oil fire, which in turn evolved into a second 
explosion and an even more devastating fire, largely because workers on two sister platforms, 
the Tartan and the Claymore, located within 12 and 22 miles from the mother platform, 
did not stop pumping into the pipelines they all shared, in effect feeding a fire that might 
otherwise have burned itself  out.  Lord Cullen discovered that even as they watched the 
Piper Alpha burn, the men in command on the Tartan came to blows, with one man refusing 
to listen to the other’s advice that he shut down the pumping operation, claiming he needed 
permission from corporate headquarters in Aberdeen to take such a drastic step.
Lord Cullen also found that although Occidental had anticipated the possibility of  such a 
disastrous chain reaction, neither the onshore regulatory authority nor the company had 
planned an effective response, including training workers on evacuation procedures.  He 
noted that the regulatory authority had inspected Piper Alpha only a month before the 
explosion, but that the inspection was so superficial that it was of  little use.  He called for a 
comprehensive overhaul of  the entire regulatory system, beginning with the separation of  
royalties collection from the safety inspection function.
The causes and consequences of  the Deepwater Horizon disaster are eerily reminiscent of  
Lord Cullen’s account of  what happened on Piper Alpha:
As at Piper Alpha, a weak and inherently conflicted regulatory regime left a complex • 
industry operating in a dangerous, unforgiving environment to its own devices, with 
dire consequences that appear to have been entirely preventable.
As at Piper Alpha, advance plans for the design and operation of  the Horizon rig • 
were grossly insufficient, leading to short cuts and pressure to forge ahead with 
production that would prove fatal.142
Like the Piper Alpha incident, signs of  trouble on the Horizon began to accumulate • 
hours, days, and even weeks before the chain reaction began.143
Poor communication between workers on both Piper Alpha and the Deepwater • 
Horizon, as well as lax safety training with respect to routine maintenance activities, 
led to an unstoppable chain reaction.144 
Once the explosion and fire began, the chain of  command on Piper Alpha and the • 
Deepwater Horizon became dysfunctional, with rescue operations fundamentally 
compromised.145
The failure of  U.S. regulators to learn from mistakes made in a country so closely related 
to the United States by history and language is a disconnect in public policymaking that we 
cannot afford to repeat.
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The norwegian experience
As in Britain, the petroleum industry is central to the Norwegian economy, and the country 
ranks as the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and 11th largest oil producer.  Some 60 fields in 
the Norwegian Continent Shelf  produce about 2.5 million barrels annually.  Unlike Britain, 
the Norwegians made a decision to invest heavily in Statoil, the largest holder of  drilling 
licenses in the county, 67 percent of  which is publicly owned.  One of  the largest oil fields 
in the North Sea, known as Ekofisk, is located about 200 miles southwest of  the Norwegian 
city of  Stavanger, that country’s equivalent of  Aberdeen.  In 1977, about six years after 
production in this area began, the Bravo platform owned by Phillips Petroleum had a 
blowout, once again due to human error, spilling an estimated 80,000-120,000 barrels of  oil 
into the North Sea.  No lives were lost, but the spill remains the largest on record in the area.
British and norwegian Responses
In the wake of  the Cullen Report, the British Parliament transferred responsibility for 
regulation of  offshore drilling to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the English 
equivalent of  the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  The HSE was already 
in the throes of  adopting “goal-oriented” regulation to replace “command and control” 
regulation.  Proponents justified this transformation as superior to the old regime because 
making individual companies responsible for designing their own safety systems would instill 
a far more effective “culture of  safety” than prescribing a series of  rigid rules that devolved 
to simple, relatively mindless “box ticking.”  To develop redundant systems capable of  
preventing accidents on facilities that are akin to building a dormitory on top of  a deepwater 
volcano would take bottom up, fully integrated cooperation by everyone on a rig.
Consequently, the HSE leaves virtually all of  the details of  designing an effective safety 
system to corporate platform operators through the preparation of  facility-specific “safety 
cases.”  The HSE’s experts review each safety case and periodically inspect platforms and 
rigs to ensure that these plans are implemented.  But, at least in theory, each plan could be 
very different from plans for other facilities, even facilities owned by the same company, 
and still receive regulatory approval.  The HSE deemphasizes enforcement for failures 
to implement safety cases, once again focusing on establishing a positive, cooperative 
relationship with the oil and gas industry in the North Sea.
Safety cases are prepared by consultants in accordance with a set of  regulations that explain, 
in essence, what topics must be covered in each plan, but do not specify the content of  
the plan.146  So, for example, rather than specifying the equipment that must be kept in the 
infirmary on a large rig, the regulations specify that the rig operator must ensure that people 
present on the rig receive effective emergency medical treatment—a dicey proposition in the 
case of  a serious accident since rigs can be located as far as a two or three hour helicopter 
ride offshore.  Other topics to be addressed include standards and procedures for controlling 
risks, competence and training, selection of  key personnel, control of  change (of  shifts, 
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of  design, of  production goals), selection and control over contractors, and planning and 
control for emergencies.
Safety cases are expected to achieve the overall goal of  “an individual risk of  death of  10-3 
[1 in 1,000] per year.”147  This level of  risk is quite high and compares unfavorably to the 
levels Americans typically accept in the context of  environmental exposures: 1 in 100,000 or 
1 in 1,000,000.  In determining whether to require a company to install a specific piece of  
equipment or implement a specific design, the regulations state that the measure must not 
be “grossly disproportionate” to the benefit gained.148  They add that an offshore operator 
should be expected to shoulder an “implied cost” generally measured as six times the value 
of  each life saved, with a life worth £1 million (about $1.56 million in August of  2010).  
Again, this allocation is quite low compared to similar American cost-benefit analyses.
One final feature of  the British system of  overriding importance is that all safety cases are 
held in the strictest confidence.  No one except the consultants, top level management, and 
the assigned agency official is allowed to see the finished document in its entirety, ostensibly 
because such documents include sensitive trade secrets such as the precise dimensions of  
the oil reservoir upon which the platform or rig is located.149  Safety representatives chosen 
by oil rig workers may review safety cases as they are being formulated and can obtain 
summaries of  the documents and extracts, but are not given a full copy to retain.
Britain does not have any independent auditing institutions such as America’s Government 
Accountability Office or Inspectors General that can conduct independent reviews of  
circumstances on the rigs.  However, Britain has a judicially-based process known as a “fatal 
accident inquiry” that is convened every time a person dies in custody or a worker is killed in 
an accident on the job.150  Trial judges (called “sheriffs”) hear witnesses and make findings, 
including recommendations about how to prevent similar incidents in the future.  Several 
high-profile inquiries have involved safety offshore, and serve as a separate incentive for 
improving accident prevention and response.
In Norway, the combination of  the Bravo blowout and the Piper Alpha catastrophe 
provoked the establishment of  the country’s systematic safety regulations, and an informal 
rivalry has since arisen between Norwegian and British authorities over which country 
enjoys the best safety record and has the most stringent regulations.  The Petroleum 
Safety Authority (PSA) is the Norwegian equivalent of  Britain’s HSE.  It has issued 
a comprehensive set of  regulations governing everything from the design and safety 
equipment that must be installed on a platform to emergency response planning and 
preparedness.151  The regulations provide for enforcement, including the assessment of  
penalties for violations of  their requirements.  They are significantly more prescriptive than 
their British counterparts, although Norwegian regulators also describe their regulatory 
structure as a “goal-oriented” and “cooperative” with industry, perhaps an easier claim to 
make since the largest share of  the market is held by a nationalized corporation.
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Regulatory Failures and Proposed Reforms
Regulatory Failure: ignoring other Countries’ experiences with offshore 
Drilling Disasters
Congress and the MMS have failed to pay attention to the experience of  other offshore oil 
producing countries.  They have not assessed other regulatory approaches or incorporated 
the lessons learned from accidents, blowouts, and spills that have occurred elsewhere.  
Numerous reports have now brought to light regulatory requirements imposed by other 
countries—including the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and Brazil—that might possibly 
have prevented the BP oil spill or significantly improved the U.S. response capability.  This 
reactive approach to evaluating the experience abroad simply made it more likely that we 
would have to suffer our own disaster before we learned lessons from the experience of  
other countries.
Proposed Reform: Mandate Systematic Review of the experience of other 
Countries and incorporate into Routine Congressional oversight
Numerous criticisms can and have been made of  the British and Norwegian regulatory 
approaches, and aspects of  their approaches may not be compatible with the American 
regulatory framework.152   But investigations of  accidents that occur abroad and analyses 
of  the weaknesses in other countries’ regulatory systems can highlight similar weaknesses 
in the U.S. system, prompting needed reforms.  In the wake of  the BP spill, the idea of  the 
safety case, a prominent feature of  the British system, is now being debated in congressional 
hearings and proposed legislation.  Whether or not this concept or any particular technique 
or requirement is ultimately adopted, an evaluation of  other approaches that have proven 
effective elsewhere should not occur simply in reaction to a disaster.
Instead, Congress should ensure that BOEMRE undertakes an ongoing, systematic 
evaluation of  the lessons learned elsewhere in the wake of  serious accidents, and of  
alternative regulatory measures and techniques that have proven effective.  With greater 
attention to the regulatory approaches of  other countries, BOEMRE and legislative 
oversight committees could ensure not only that U.S. safety and environmental regulation is 
the best it can be, but also that royalty rates, bonding requirements, and other aspects of  the 
oil leasing system are adequate.  These additional sources of  experience and information can 
also help to enhance U.S. regulators’ knowledge about industry practices and technology, an 
area that has been identified as a pervasive weakness in the MMS during the years leading up 
to the BP oil spill.  
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